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Abstract
Cryptanalysis of Some Block Cipher Constructions
Ahmed Abdelkhalek, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2017
When the public-key cryptography was introduced in the 1970s, symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy was believed to soon become outdated. Nevertheless, we still heavily rely on symmetric-
key primitives as they give high-speed performance. They are used to secure mobile commu-
nication, e-commerce transactions, communication through virtual private networks and send-
ing electronic tax returns, among many other everyday activities. However, the security of
symmetric-key primitives does not depend on a well-known hard mathematical problem such as
the factoring problem, which is the basis of the RSA public-key cryptosystem. Instead, the secu-
rity of symmetric-key primitives is evaluated against known cryptanalytic techniques. Accord-
ingly, the topic of furthering the state-of-the-art of cryptanalysis of symmetric-key primitives is
an ever-evolving topic. Therefore, this thesis is dedicated to the cryptanalysis of symmetric-key
cryptographic primitives. Our focus is on block ciphers as well as hash functions that are built
using block ciphers. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
First, we tackle the limitation of the current Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
approaches to represent the differential propagation through large S-boxes. Indeed, we present
a novel approach that can efficiently model the Difference Distribution Table (DDT) of large
S-boxes, i.e., 8-bit S-boxes. As a proof of the validity and efficiency of our approach, we apply
iii
it on two out of the seven AES-round based constructions that were recently proposed in FSE
2016. Using our approach, we improve the lower bound on the number of active S-boxes of one
construction and the upper bound on the best differential characteristic of the other.
Then, we propose meet-in-the-middle attacks using the idea of efficient differential enu-
meration against two Japanese block ciphers, i.e., Hierocrypt-L1 and Hierocrypt-3. Both block
ciphers were submitted to the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption
(NESSIE) project, selected as one of the Japanese e-Government recommended ciphers in 2003
and reselected in the candidate recommended ciphers list in 2013. We construct five S-box layer
distinguishers that we use to recover the master keys of reduced 8 S-box layer versions of both
block ciphers. In addition, we present another meet-in-the-middle attack on Hierocrypt-3 with
slightly higher time and memory complexities but with much less data complexity.
Afterwards, we shift focus to another equally important cryptanalytic attack, i.e., impos-
sible differential attack. SPARX-64/128 is selected among the SPARX family that was recently
proposed to provide ARX based block cipher whose security against differential and linear
cryptanalysis can be proven. We assess the security of SPARX-64/128 against impossible dif-
ferential attack and show that it can reach the same number of rounds the division-based integral
attack, proposed by the designers, can reach. Then, we pick Kiasu-BC as an example of a tweak-
able block cipher and prove that, on contrary to its designers’ claim, the freedom in choosing the
publicly known tweak decreases its security margin. Lastly, we study the impossible differential
properties of the underlying block cipher of the Russian hash standard Streebog and point out
the potential risk in using it as a MAC scheme in the secret-IV mode.
iv
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Cryptology can be thought of as a coin where cryptography is one side and cryptanalysis
is the other [139]. While cryptography deals with the design of algorithms achieving specific
security goals, cryptanalysis studies attacks on such algorithms with the goal of violating their
security claims. The set of security goals considered in modern cryptography varies accord-
ing to its application and includes confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, anonymity and non-
repudiation [112]. The building blocks of many current information systems that are used to
provide such security goals are called cryptographic primitives.
Cryptographic primitives comprise symmetric-key or secret-key primitives, asymmetric-key
or public-key primitives and unkeyed primitives (see Figure 1.1). In the symmetric-key primi-
tives, a shared key that is kept secret within a restricted group is used. In the public-key primi-
tives, each user has a pair of keys; one is kept private and never shared and the other is public.
The unkeyed primitives, as their name suggests, do not use any secret key. After the invention of
public-key cryptography in the mid 1970s, there was a misconception that symmetric-key prim-
itives would become obsolete. However, they are still extensively used as they achieve high-
speed performance or low-cost encryption, fast authentication, and efficient hashing. Nowadays,
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symmetric-key primitives are used in securing many applications including cell phones commu-
nications, credit card transactions, and Wi-Fi connections and symmetric-key cryptology is an
active research area as it has always been. In fact, there is still a compelling need to further the
symmetric-key cryptology research. On the one hand, the huge demand for deploying resource-
constrained, yet cryptographically-secure, devices such as RFID tags and wireless sensor nodes
dictates the demand for low-cost primitives. On the other hand, the development of the state-of-
the-art of cryptanalysis may threaten the security of some existing and widely used primitives.
Therefore, the problem of studying new cryptographic techniques remains necessary to evaluate



































































Figure 1.1: Cryptographic primitives classification [112]
1.2 Symmetric-key Cryptographic Primitives
A symmetric-key cryptographic primitive is a transformation that takes two inputs (data and
a secret key) and maps them to one output. Three basic types that are of interest are: ciphers
(either block or stream ciphers), Message Authentication Codes (MACs), and authenticated en-
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cryption schemes. Strictly speaking, cryptographic hash functions are not symmetric-key cryp-
tographic primitives, since they do not use a secret key. However, MACs can be constructed
using hash functions. Moreover, hash functions can be built using block ciphers. Therefore,
the properties of hash functions are closely related to those of symmetric-key cryptographic
primitives and thus are also considered in our work. Symmetric-key cryptographic primitives
can be employed to directly achieve data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Other se-
curity goals, e.g. non-repudiation, are achieved by cryptographic protocols that are based on
symmetric-key cryptographic primitives.
Block ciphers and stream ciphers provide data confidentiality by encrypting a plaintext (the
input message) to a ciphertext (the transformed output message). For a fixed key, block ciphers
and stream ciphers become invertible mappings. On the one hand, a block cipher [89] can be
thought of as a class of permutations on blocks of bits. When a particular key is selected, a
specific permutation is chosen out of this class. The encryption process is done by applying this
permutation to the plaintext yielding the ciphertext. The plaintext is restored via the decryption
process by applying the inverse permutation to the ciphertext. On the other hand, a stream
cipher [41] generates an infinite stream of pseudo-random digits (keystream) which is XORed
with the plaintext (ciphertext) to produce the ciphertext (plaintext).
MACs [123] provide data integrity and authenticity. A MAC primitive takes the input mes-
sage and the secret key and computes an authentication tag which is then sent along with the
message. The recipient of the message then uses the same secret key to compute the authentica-
tion tag corresponding to the received message. If the calculated authentication tag matches the
received one, then the sender is authenticated and the message integrity is verified. It is worth
mentioning that, unlike block ciphers and stream ciphers, MAC primitives do not have to be
invertible, as both users perform the same operation to compute or verify the authentication tag.
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A hash function [122] is a primitive that transforms a message of any arbitrary, but usually
limited, length into a hash value of fixed length. In other words, a hash function compresses
a message and generates a digest that depends on all the bits of the message. Therefore, hash
functions, similar to MAC primitives, can be used to provide data integrity. However, they
do not use a secret key and thus anyone can generate the hash value for a given message. The
cryptographic properties of hash functions vary according to the application that embodies them
and can include preimage resistance, second preimage resistance and collision resistance.
Authenticated Encryption schemes (AE) [31] are symmetric-key cryptographic primitives
that provide data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity at the same time. An extension of AE
schemes is Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes. AEAD schemes
take an additional input, i.e., the Associated Data (AD) whose integrity and authenticity has to
be ensured while being sent in clear without encryption. For example, routing information in
headers of datagram packets that has to remain unencrypted for routing purposes and at the same
time has to be authenticated to detect any tampering. The design and cryptanalysis of AE(AD)
primitives have found renewed interest driven by the NIST-funded competition: Competition for
Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability and Robustness (CAESAR) [39]. CAESAR
was announced in 2013, and “will identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that (1) offer
advantages over AES-GCM and (2) are suitable for widespread adoption” [39].
1.3 Cryptanalysis Approaches: A Brief Overview
Traditionally, the end-points of the communication channel were assumed trusted and thus
the cryptographic primitives were supposed to be executed in a secure environment. In such
conventional cryptographic model, known as the black-box attack model, the adversary can
observe the output and/or input of the cryptographic primitive and can (adaptively) choose dif-
ferent types of input and/or output to the primitive. Additionally, the attacker can sometimes
specify the relation between multiple keys utilized by the primitive. The goals of the attacker
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vary according to the targeted cryptographic primitive, i.e., in the case of block and stream ci-
phers the goals include being able to distinguish the behavior of the specific cipher from the
behavior of a random permutation, to encrypt/decrypt some messages without knowing the se-
cret key or to recover information about the secret key. In MAC primitives, the attacker may
additionally attempt to generate a valid authentication tag for a given or a chosen message with-
out the knowledge of the secret key. In hash functions, the attacker may try to find two distinct
messages that yield the same hash value (a collision) or a (second) preimage for a given mes-
sage. In AE(AD) schemes, the goals of the attacker combine the goals achieved while attacking
an encryption scheme and a MAC primitive.
Within the black-box attack model, one can distinguish between structural cryptanalysis [26],
statistical cryptanalysis [149, 150] and algebraic cryptanalysis [44]. While structural cryptanal-
ysis studies the properties of the high-level building blocks of the primitives, statistical crypt-
analysis analyzes and exploits undesirable probabilistic properties of their low-level building
blocks. Algebraic cryptanalysis uses algebraic representation of the primitives to build and
solve linear and non-linear equations on input, output and key variables. In the next chapter, the
different cryptanalysis techniques are discussed in more details.
1.4 Research Contributions and Outline
In this thesis, we analyze symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. In particular, we study the
security of block ciphers and hash functions constructed using block ciphers.
 In chapter 2, block ciphers are formally introduced and an overview of the conven-
tional cryptanalysis techniques including differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis
and Meet-in-the-Middle (MitM) cryptanalysis is provided.
 In chapter 3, we propose a new Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model for
the Difference Distribution Table (DDT) of large S-boxes, i.e., 8-bit S-boxes and use our
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model to improve the bounds of two new constructions based on the AES-round function.
 In chapters 4 and 5, we propose key recovery meet-in-the-middle attacks on the Japanese
block ciphers Hierocrypt-L1 and Hierocrypt-3.
 In chapter 6, we study the security of SPARX-64/128, which is a member of the SPARX
family that followed the recently proposed long trail strategy. We assess its resistance
against impossible differential cryptanalysis.
 In chapter 7, we analyze the security of one tweakable block cipher, Kiasu-BC against the
impossible differential cryptanalysis.
 In chapter 8, we investigate the security of the underlying block cipher of the Russian
standard hash function, Streebog, against impossible differential cryptanalysis.
Some of the above contributions have been published in [1–5]. Other works conducted during
the tenure of this Ph.D. have been published in [6, 141–147].
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
In this chapter, we more formally introduce block ciphers. We also provide a high-level
literature review on some of the relevant cryptanalytic techniques.
2.1 Block Ciphers Definition
A block cipher is a symmetric-key primitive with the purpose of protecting the secrecy of
messages sent over an insecure channel. It is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Block cipher [112, Definition 7.1]) An n-bit block cipher is a function E :
Vn  K ! Vn, such that for each key K 2 K, E(P,K) is an invertible mapping (the encryption
function for K) from Vn to Vn, written EK(P ). The inverse mapping is the decryption function,
denotedDK(C). C = EK(P ) denotes the ciphertext C results from encrypting plaintext P under
K.
A block cipher can be thought of as 2k permutations on Fn2 out of its 2n! distinct permutations.
Hence, for a block cipher to be ideal, its 2k permutations have to be chosen randomly out of all
the 2n! possible permutations.
Definition 2.2 (Ideal block cipher [30]) An n-bit block cipher E is called ideal, if the family of
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2k permutations on Fn2 specified by E is selected uniformly at random from the set of all (2n)!
distinct permutation on Fn2 .
An ideal block cipher as defined above is impractical to implement as it requires storing
2k truly random selected permutations on Fn2 which is practically infeasible for typical secure
values of n and k. Therefore, the design of block ciphers is inevitably highly structured as will
be discussed in the next section.
2.2 Block Ciphers Design
In 1949, Shannon set the basis of the field of block ciphers design by putting forward the
concepts of confusion and diffusion [129] that are still considered while designing new block ci-
phers nowadays. In simple terms, confusion means that each bit of the ciphertext should depend
on as many bits as possible of the plaintext and the secret key. Confusion is usually achieved
by using non-linear components in the block cipher such as substitution boxes (S-boxes) and/or
modular addition. On the other hand, diffusion captures the influence of each plaintext bit and
each key bit on the ciphertext bits. Ideally, flipping one bit of the plaintext/ciphertext should
result in flipping each ciphertext/plaintext bit with probability 0.5. To achieve diffusion, a block
cipher designer usually uses linear transformations or permutations working at bit or byte level.
Today, the most efficient block ciphers are built by iterating a simple key-dependent round
function. Such a simple key-dependent round function acts individually as a weak block cipher
but iterating it several times achieves a high degree of confusion and diffusion and thus may
yield a strong block cipher. Figure 2.1 gives a schematic view of an iterative block cipher. More
formally, an iterative block cipher is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Iterative block cipher [33, Definition 4]) An n-bit block cipher E is called an
iterative block cipher with r rounds if for each key it can be represented as a composition of
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keyed round permutations, that is, if for each K 2 Fk2:
E(K; :) = fr(Kr; :)  fr 1(Kr 1; :)  : : :  f2(K2; :)  f1(K1; :);
where  denotes the superposition of permutations, fi(Ki; :) : Fn2 ! Fn2 are key dependent
round permutations, Ki are round subkeys derived from the secret key K using a key schedule
algorithm:















Figure 2.1: An iterative block cipher
If all the round permutations of an iterative block cipher are identical, i.e., fi = f , then it
is called an iterated block cipher. Typically, we still talk about an iterated block cipher even if
the first and/or the last round are slightly different than the other rounds. Another distinguished
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class of iterative block ciphers is the key-alternating block ciphers. In a such block cipher, the
input I to the key-dependent permutation fi is first XORed with the key Ki and then a key-
independent permutation f 0i is applied, i.e., fi(Ki; I) = f
0
i (Ki  I). A key-alternating block
cipher that uses identical key-independent permutations is called a key-iterated block cipher.
There are so many constructions to build an iterative block cipher. Figure 2.2 shows the
round functions of the two most widely accepted ones: Balanced Feistel Network (BFN) and
Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN). In a BFN, the round function input is divided into
two halves, i.e., Li and Ri and the output Li+1 and Ri+1 is computed as follows:
Li+1 = Ri;
Ri+1 = Li  f(Ki; Ri);
where Ki is the ith round subkey and f is the round function. A BFN has the advantage of
reusing the implementation of the encryption function to implement the decryption one where
the round subkeys are used in reverse. The former U.S. encryption standard DES [59], which is
an iterated non-key-alternating block cipher, follows the BFN construction. The round function
of an SPN block cipher consists of three layers (not necessarily in the following order): the par-
allel execution of S-boxes, linear permutation, and round subkey addition layer. The decryption
function in SPN block ciphers is performed by inverting the encryption process while taking the
round subkeys in reversed order. The advantage of SPN block ciphers lies in the fact that they
tend to have good diffusion properties. The current U.S. encryption standard AES [115], which
is a key-iterated block cipher, employs the SPN construction.
Other constructions to build iterative block ciphers include the Lai-Massey scheme followed
by the IDEA block cipher [95], and Generalized Feistel Network (GFN) exemplified by the













Figure 2.2: Round function of (a) Balanced Feistel Network, and (b) Substitution-Permutation
Network
2.3 Block Ciphers Security
The notion of perfect security, the highest level of security, introduced by Shannon [129], is
defined as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Perfect security [114, Definition 6]) A cipher is called perfectly secure if the
ciphertext does not reveal any information about the plaintext, or in other words, if the plaintext
and the ciphertext are statistically independent.
It was proved by Shannon that the entropy of the key in a perfectly secure cipher has to be
at least as high as the entropy of the plaintext. This means that the length of the key in such
ciphers must, at least, equal the length of the plaintext and it cannot be reused again. As large
amounts of data need to be encrypted, perfectly secure block ciphers are impractical. Instead,
practical block ciphers can achieve at most computational security defined as follows:
Definition 2.5 (Computational security [114, Definition 7]) A block cipher E using a k-bit
secret key is called computationally secure if there exist no attacks on E with a complexity
less than the one of an exhaustive key search, i.e., 2k, where the complexity of the attack com-
prises the time (work factor), memory (storage requirement), and data (type and amount of
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data) complexities required to perform the attack.
As the above definition implies, it is difficult to evaluate and/or prove that a block cipher
is computationally (in)secure. Thus, the security of block ciphers is typically evaluated by
considering their resistance against a large set of predefined cryptanalytic attacks and depends
on two factors: the goal of the adversary and the assumed attack model, i.e., what the attacker
is allowed to do to launch a certain attack.
2.3.1 Adversary’s Goal
The goal of the adversary differs greatly with the application in which the cipher is deployed.
Below, we give a hierarchical classification of these goals, following Knudsen [92], starting
with the most powerful attack while assuming that the block cipher is used for encryption only:
 Total Break: The adversary recovers the secret key K.
 Global Deduction: The adversary can construct an algorithm that is functionally equiva-
lent to EK or DK without knowing K.
 Local Deduction: The adversary can decrypt (encrypt) a previously unseen ciphertext
(plaintext) without knowing K.
 Distinguishing Algorithm: The adversary can distinguish between the block cipher in-
stantiated with a randomly chosen key and a randomly chosen permutation.
2.3.2 Attack Models
The attack models specify the capabilities of the adversary while trying to violate the security
claims of a block cipher designer. In our work, we focus on the model assumed in conventional
cryptography, i.e., the black-box attack model. In this model, the end-users of the communica-
tion channel are assumed to be trusted. This attack model can be classified to the following types
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according to the operations on the input and/or output of the block cipher, which the adversary
is allowed to perform:
 Ciphertext-only: The attacker can observe ciphertexts without any access to plaintexts.
This is the weakest attack scenario and if a cipher is vulnerable to such attack, it is con-
sidered completely insecure.
 Known-plaintext: The attacker observes a number of plaintexts and their corresponding
ciphertexts.
 Chosen-plaintext (ciphertext): The attacker can choose plaintexts (ciphertexts) to be en-
crypted (decrypted) before the attack and observes their corresponding ciphertexts (plain-
texts) during the attack.
 Adaptively-chosen-plaintext (ciphertext): On top of the chosen-plaintext (ciphertext) ca-
pabilities mentioned above, the attacker can choose plaintexts (ciphertexts) during the
attack based on some intermediate results obtained during the attack.
 Related-key: The attacker can encrypt (decrypt) plaintexts (ciphertexts) with the attacked
key and other keys related to it, where such relation is known or even chosen by the
attacker [19].
It is to be noted that the above classification is not comprehensive, for example, we can mix
attacks from these classes yielding a, usually, more efficient one. In addition, in block cipher
based hash functions, the key of the underlying block cipher is known or even under the control
of the attacker and thus other attacks, such as the known key and the chosen key settings [91]
can be relevant in this case.
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2.4 Attacks on Block Ciphers
In this section, we discuss the most common attacks on block ciphers within the black-box
attack model described above. The attacks in this model can be classified into generic and non-
generic attacks. Generic attacks exploit the core parameters of the block cipher, e.g., the block
size and key length. Non-generic attacks additionally exploit the block cipher internal structure
and the specifications of its components.
Generic Attacks
Exhaustive key search (brute-force) attack: In this attack, all the possible values of the
secret key are tested against a known plaintext/ciphertext pair. The time complexity of this
attack to recover a k-bit secret key is about 2k encryptions. If the attack results in more than one
key, then it is repeated against additional plaintext/ciphertext pair. The unicity distance [112]
determines the number of pairs needed to have a single key. Another variant of the brute-force
attack is the so-called the dictionary attack which trades memory against time. In the dictionary
attack, which is a chosen plaintext attack, the attacker first stores the encryption of a random
plaintext under all the 2k possible values of the key in a lookup table T . Then, in the actual
attack, the chosen plaintext is encrypted using the secret key and the resulting ciphertext is
looked up in T to identify the correct key.
Ciphertext-collision attack: First, the attacker gets 2n=2 random plaintext/ciphertext pairs
encrypted using the secret key and stores them in a lookup table T , where n is the block size in
bits. Afterwards, the attacker observes 2n=2 random ciphertexts and, due to the birthday paradox,
one of these ciphertexts will match one of the ciphertexts stored in T with high probability.
Then, the attacker instantly gets the corresponding plaintext as it is stored in T as well. In a
variant of this attack, called the codebook attack, the attacker can store all 2n plaintext/ciphertext
pairs. Hence, any ciphertext can readily be decrypted by means of a single table lookup.
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Time-memory trade-off attack [73,119]: In this attack, the key space is broken into smaller
sets and then each of these sets is exhaustively searched. In Hellman’s time-memory trade-
off attack, a k-bit key is found in 22k=3 operations with 22k=3 words of memory by using 2k
precomputations to create the offline lookup table.
Key-collision attack [20]: This attack resembles the ciphertext-collision attack mentioned
above but here the attacker uses the birthday paradox to identify the correct key. First, the
attacker encrypts a number of plaintexts, determined by the unicity distance, using 2k=2 random
known keys and stores the keys and the corresponding ciphertexts in a lookup table T . Then,
these plaintexts are encrypted using 2k=2 random secret keys. Due to the birthday paradox, one
of these keys will match one of the known keys with a high probability resulting in the same
ciphertext values.
Related-key cube-based attacks [40]: A variant of the cube attack [65] can be applied to
all block ciphers in the related-key setting. To recover the secret key, such attack requires 2
k
2k
encryptions, log k words of memory and negligible precomputations.
As the generic attacks are entirely independent on the block cipher design or its specifica-
tion, the only countermeasure against these attacks is to increase the key and plaintext spaces.
Currently, NIST’s recommended key length specified in bits is a specific value from the set
f80; 112; 128; 192; 256g noting that an 80-bit key length is no longer considered sufficiently
secure [117].
Non-generic Attacks
Non-generic attacks exploit particular properties of the block cipher design, i.e., its structure
and internal components. Usually, in the non-generic attacks, the adversary first attempts to
construct a distinguisher that covers as many rounds of the block cipher as possible and which
holds with a relatively high probability. Then, this distinguisher is extended to a key-recovery
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attack on a few additional rounds using partial decryption and/or encryption. First, the involved
bits of the subkeys of the appended rounds are guessed. Then, the ciphertext and/or the plaintext
is partially decrypted/encrypted using these guessed subkeys to calculate the intermediate state
values at the ends of the distinguisher. If the subkeys are correctly guessed then the distinguisher
should hold, otherwise, it fails.
Differential Cryptanalysis: Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack that was
published in the academic literature by Biham and Shamir in 1990 by applying it on DES [25].
In differential cryptanalysis, the adversary looks at the input difference and at an intermediate
difference after a few rounds. In other words, the distinguisher that differential cryptanalysis
exploits is a differential [96], i.e., a pair of differences (I1, Is+1) that holds with a probability
p significantly higher than 2 n, where I1 is the input difference, and Is+1 is the output
difference after s rounds, and n is the block size in bits.
The data complexity, in terms of the number of chosen plaintext pairs, of a differential crypt-
analysis is inversely proportional to the probability of the differential, i.e., the higher the prob-
ability of the differential is, the lower the data complexity of attack will be. However, in many
ciphers, finding differentials that hold with high probability is not an easy task. Instead, one
searches for differential trails where an s-round differential trail is a sequence of s + 1 differ-
ences (I1;I2; : : : ;Is;Is+1), where Ii is the input difference at round i. That is, while
a differential cares about the input and output differences, a differential trail cares about how
the difference is propagated throughout the block cipher components. Through non-linear com-
ponents, the difference propagates with some probability, and it propagates deterministically
through linear ones. Then, the probability of an s-round differential trail is approximated byQs
i=1 pi, where pi is the probability of this differential trail in round i. As an s-round differen-
tial (I1, Is+1) can be thought of as the set of all possible differential trails (I1, : : : , Is+1)
that have the same input and output differences, the probability of a differential is the sum of the
probabilities of all its constituent differential trails. In general, the probability of a differential
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can depend on the values of the key, the input and the output. Practically, these dependen-
cies are assumed negligible based on the Markov cipher assumption, hypothesis of stochastic
equivalence and hypothesis of independent round subkeys [96].
Along the years, differential cryptanalysis has proved to be a powerful cryptanalytic tech-
nique against symmetric-key primitives and since its introduction, several variants, tweaks and
generalizations have been made. Knudsen introduced truncated differential attacks that exploit
differentials where only parts of the input and output differences are known [88]. In the same
paper and based on Lai’s initial consideration [94], Knudsen has also proposed higher-order
differentials, which care about multiple differences concurrently by arranging them in distinct
levels of recursion. The boomerang attack was later introduced by Wagner, it allows connecting
two different differentials over different parts of the cipher that do not overlap in the middle.
The boomerang attack was further generalized to the amplified boomerang attack [86] and the
rectangle attack [22].
Linear Cryptanalysis: Linear cryptanalysis is another major cryptanalysis technique used
against symmetric-key primitives. It was applied on DES by Matsui [108]. In linear cryptanal-
ysis, which is a known plaintext attack, the s-round distinguisher exploited is a linear approxi-
mation that holds with probability p:
 1  I1   s+1  Is+1 = 0;
where  denotes the scalar product over F2, I1; Is+1 are the input at round 1 and output at round
s, respectively, and  1; s+1 are called the input and output linear masks. In an ideal block
cipher, the above linear approximation holds with probability 0.5. Therefore, the higher the bias
 = jp   1=2j of this linear approximation is, the more the cipher deviates from an ideal block
cipher.
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In linear cryptanalysis, the number of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs is inversely propor-
tional to the squared bias, i.e. 2, of the linear approximation. Similar to differentials, efficient
linear approximations are found by searching for linear trails where an s-round linear trail is a
sequence of s+1 linear masks ( 1; 2; : : : ; s; s+1). For the full linear trail to hold, each round
linear approximation  i  Ii   i+1  Ii+1 = 0 has to hold with bias i. The propagation of the
linear approximations is probabilistic through non-linear components and deterministic through
linear ones. The bias of an s-round linear trail can be computed as 2s 1
Qs
i=1 i, according to
the piling-up lemma [108] and under the same assumptions mentioned above in the differential
cryptanalysis, where i is the bias of the linear approximation at round i. The pair ( 1; s+1)
defines the so-called linear hull consisting of all linear trails that have the same input and output
linear masks. Nyberg showed that the expected squared bias of a linear approximation aver-
aged over all round keys is the sum of the expected squared biases of all relevant linear trails
averaged over all round keys [118]. Later, it was proved that for key-alternating ciphers, the
expected squared bias of a linear approximation averaged over all round keys is the sum of the
squared biases of all relevant linear trails, which are then independent of the key [53].
After its introduction, many extensions and improvements of linear cryptanalysis have been
proposed. For example, to reduce the data complexity, chosen-plaintext linear cryptanalysis was
proposed [90]. To the same end, Hermelin, Cho, and Nyberg have studied multidimensional
linear attacks [74]. Recently, Bogdanov et al. have introduced the concept of zero-correlation
attacks [37]. These attacks are based on linear trails with zero bias, i.e., their probabilities are
exactly 0:5. A more generalized form of zero-correlation attacks, particularly attacks based on
key-invariant biases, was introduced by Bogdanov et al. [34].
Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks: In 1977, Diffie and Hellman were the first to propose the meet-
in-the-middle (MitM) attack for the cryptanalysis of DES [61]. Demirci and Selc¸uk were the
first to apply the MitM approach on AES [56] triggering a new line of research, we refer to their
attack as the plain MitM attack. They have shown that if the input of four AES rounds has just
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one active (non-zero difference) byte then the value of each byte of the output can be described
as a parameterized function of that active byte. The number of parameters was deduced to be
25 8-bit parameters in [56] and then reduced to 24 8-bit parameters in [57]. The reduction in
the number of parameters was possible by noticing that any of the 25 parameters can be taken
as a reference for the others. Therefore, by considering the differences of the functions rather
than the mere values, only 24 parameters can be used. The main disadvantage of this MitM
attack, even with the reduced number of parameters, is the high memory requirement to store a
precomputation table of all the sequences resulting from all the possible combinations of these
parameters. As such, this attack only works for AES-256 and then a time-memory trade-off is
used to extend the attack to AES-192.
At ASIACRYPT 2010, Dunkelman, Keller, and Shamir [67] proposed a couple of new ideas
to address the high memory requirement of this MitM attack. First, they showed that the pre-
computation table does not need to have the whole sequence, just its associated multiset, i.e.,
the unordered sequence with multiplicity rather than the ordered one. The introduction of the
multiset concept reduced the size of the precomputation table by a factor of four. However, the
more significant reduction in the size of the precomputation table was due to the second and
main idea, which they called the differential enumeration. Differential enumeration reduced
the number of parameters that describe the sequence or rather the multiset from 24 bytes to 16
bytes. This is achievable by relying on a low probability truncated differential characteristic
where the generated sequence or multiset at its output can only take a restricted number of val-
ues. Consequently, the memory requirement has been reduced from 2192 to 2128. However, the
use of this truncated differential characteristic increases the data complexity as now we have
to search through a large amount of input data pairs to find one pair that conforms to the used
truncated differential characteristic.
Later on, at Eurocrypt 2013, Derbez, Fouque and Jean showed that it is possible, by bor-
rowing ideas from the rebound attack [111], to enumerate the whole set of sequences more
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efficiently [58]. In particular, they showed that using their technique, which they called efficient
enumeration, the whole set can take only 280 values instead of 2128. This means that the number
of parameters is further reduced to 10 parameters only. The consequences of using the efficient
enumeration technique were numerous. Firstly, the attack became feasible on AES-128 and in
fact, their attack is considered the most efficient attack on 7-round reduced AES-128. Secondly,
the use of a 5-round truncated differential characteristic is feasible which mounts to attacking
9-round reduced AES-256. Thirdly, the memory complexity is no longer the bottleneck of the
attack.
Finally, Li, Jia and Wang [99] employed a key-dependent sieve to further reduce the memory
complexity of Derbez’s attack. This technique helped them present an attack on 9-round reduced
AES-192 using a 5-round truncated differential characteristic and an attack on 8-round reduced
PRINCE. The key-dependent sieve was later used to mount an attack on 10-round reduced
AES-256 [100].
Differential-linear cryptanalysis: The differential and linear attacks have been used jointly
for the first time by Langford and Hellman [97]. In the Differential-linear cryptanalysis, the
cipher is split into two parts such that for the first part of the cipher, a high-probability truncated
differential exists and for the second part, a high-bias linear approximation is found. Langford
and Hellman introduced a specific case with a probability-one differential. Following that, Bi-
ham et al. [23] generalized the differential-linear cryptanalysis by using a probabilistic truncated
differential. Under some assumptions, the resulting linear approximation is estimated to have
a bias 0 = 2p2, where p is the probability of the differential and  is the bias of the linear
approximation. Blondeau et al. [32] have revisited the differential-linear cryptanalysis to apply
the theoretical link between linear and differential cryptanalysis [42]. They were able to use a
closed expression to accurately express the bias of a differential-linear approximation, with just
one assumption, that is the two parts of the cipher are independent. They further introduced a
multidimensional generalization of differential-linear cryptanalysis that includes multiple input
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differences and multidimensional linear output masks.
Impossible differential cryptanalysis: Biham et al. [21] and Knudsen [87] have indepen-
dently proposed impossible differential attacks, which is one of the most powerful cryptanalytic
techniques. Firstly, we try to find a certain input difference that propagates to a specific output
difference with zero probability resulting in an impossible differential distinguisher. In general,
the input and output differences can be truncated. Then, after finding the longest possible im-
possible differential, it is used in a key recovery attack by prepending and/or appending a few
additional rounds, which are usually called the analysis rounds. The attack proceeds as follows:
first, we collect pairs with certain plaintext and ciphertext differences. Then, we guess some bits
of the key material involved in the analysis rounds and if one of the pairs satisfies the input and
output differences of the impossible differential under some subkey bits, then these subkey bits
must be wrong. Thus, we discard as many wrong keys as possible and do an exhaustive search
on the surviving ones along with the rest of the key. The early abort technique [104] allows us
to guess the involved key material on steps to discard the undesired pairs as early as possible
and therefore reduce the time complexity of the attack.
Structural cryptanalysis. While statistical cryptanalysis exploits low-level statistical behav-
ior of the block cipher components, structural cryptanalysis relies on its high level properties.
Below, we give two examples of structural attacks.
Multiset attacks: Multiset attacks are chosen-plaintext attacks, which are comparable to dif-
ferential cryptanalysis. In Multiset attacks, the adversary tracks the deterministic propagation
of a chosen set of plaintexts (multisets) and their properties through the cipher, where a multiset
is a set where each element can appear several times. Thus, the exploited distinguisher in these
attacks has a probability of one. Examples of multiset attacks include the square attack [50]
and the integral cryptanalysis [93], which was quite recently generalized by the division prop-
erty [140].
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Slide attacks and Reflection attacks: While slide attacks, introduced by Biryukov and Wag-
ner [27, 28], exploit self-similarity properties of the block cipher round functions, reflection
attacks, proposed by Kara and Manap [82, 83], exploit self-similarity between its encryption
and decryption algorithms. Slide attacks are so powerful that, if they exist, they would be in-
dependent of the number of rounds of the block cipher, i.e., they can attack any number of
rounds. However, the countermeasure against these attacks is quite simple by introducing round
constants to break any self-similarity.
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Chapter 3
MILP Modeling for (Large) S-boxes to
Optimize Probability of Differential
Characteristics
Over the past few years, Mixed Integer Linear Programing (MILP) has been successfully
employed to efficiently find the best differential characteristic, linear approximation, longest im-
possible differential, zero-correlation linear approximation and division trail for many symmetric-
key primitives. In the existing approach, the linear inequalities used to restrict the input and
output variables of an n-bit S-box to the region of feasible solutions can be generated by using
either SageMath or multiple logical condition operations. Both methods become computation-
ally infeasible when the size of the S-box input exceeds 5-bits.
In this chapter, we address this limitation and propose an efficient way to generate the linear
inequalities representing the differential propagation through large S-boxes (6-bit and upwards).
We start by separating the DDT entries of the S-box by their values. Then, we assign a Boolean
function to each distinct value and transform each Boolean function to its minimized product-
of-sum form, which can be efficiently represented by a set of linear inequalities. Our approach
allows us to precisely evaluate the probability of differential characteristics. We have applied
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our proposed approach on two of the efficient AES-round function based constructions proposed
in FSE 2016 by Jean and Nikolic´ and managed to improve the lower bound on the number of
the active S-boxes in one construction and the upper bound on the differential characteristic of
the other. Although we have applied our approach in the context of differential cryptanalysis,
its application can easily be extended to linear cryptanalysis.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [3].
3.1 Introduction
The use of Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) as a supporting tool in the symmetric-
key cryptography has started by Mouha et al. [113] and Wu and Wang [152]. They have pro-
posed two slightly different approaches to model the problem of finding a lower bound on the
number of active S-boxes for both differential and linear cryptanalysis as an MILP problem
that can be solved by any MILP solver such as Gurobi Optimizer [71], and CPLEX Optimiza-
tion Studio [75]. Such a lower bound and the maximum differential (linear) probability of the
S-box derive an upper bound on the probability of the best differential characteristic (linear ap-
proximation). This helps the designer of symmetric-key primitives prove its resistance against
differential (linear) cryptanalysis after a given number of rounds.
The use of MILP in symmetric-key cryptography has been amplified in the past few years.
It was used by Sun et al. to find the best differential characteristic in a number of bit-oriented
SPN block ciphers [134] in the single-key and related-key settings. They have used a heuris-
tic approach and therefore the automatically found differential characteristic has to be verified
manually as it might be invalid. Shortly afterwards, Sun et al. proposed a methodology to
exactly represent the differential propagation through an S-box [133]. Their methodology was
computationally feasible when the size of the S-box is small, i.e., 5-bit or less. Then, Fu et al.
proposed an MILP-based method to search for the best differential and linear trails in Addition
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Rotation XOR (ARX) block ciphers under the assumption of independent inputs to both the
modular addition and the different rounds [69].
Recently, Sasaki and Todo presented an MILP-based tool to automatically search for the
longest impossible differential in SPN based block ciphers [127]. They have pointed out the
inability of the current approaches to efficiently represent large S-boxes and suggested the use
of, what they have called, the arbitrary S-box mode to represent the differential propagation
of the 8-bit S-boxes DDT. Independently, Cui et al. proposed a similar tool to search for im-
possible differentials and zero-correlation linear approximations with emphasis on ARX block
ciphers [49].
MILP usage was not limited to differential and linear cryptanalysis only and was extended
to Integral cryptanalysis. Xiang et al. [153] have proposed an MILP-method to find integral
distinguishers based on the division property [140] and applied it on six lightweight block ci-
phers. Soon after, their approach was extended to primitives with non-bit permutation linear
layers and ARX based primitives by Sun et al. [130, 131]. However, the solutions of Sun et al.
were found to encompass some infeasible division trails, which could affect the search results
and yield shorter integral distinguisher as was shown in [154].
In this chapter, we present a new MILP modeling that can be applied to the DDT of (large) S-
boxes. This modeling permits the utilization of the MILP approach on block ciphers that employ
8-bit S-boxes. First, we separate the DDT according to each distinct probability value and assign
a Boolean function to each of these values. The truth tables of these Boolean functions are built
considering that their inputs are the input and output difference bits and each function evaluates
to 1 when its corresponding probability value occurs for that input-output difference pair, and
0 otherwise. Then, these truth tables are converted to their minimum Product of Sum (PoS)
forms and each term in the PoS is converted to a linear inequality. The special case of zero input
difference being propagated to zero output difference is handled separately.
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Out of the seven constructions (C1 to C7) proposed in [77], we applied our modeling ap-
proach on two arbitrarily selected constructions, i.e., C1 and C5. The designers showed that the
minimum number of active S-boxes is 22 for both constructions, which ensures that the upper
bound on the probability is 2 132. Regarding C1, we show that the best probability is slightly
smaller, i.e., 2 134. Regarding C5, we show that none of the truncated differentials that have
22 or even 23 active S-boxes can be instantiated. Hence, we improve the lower bound on the
number of active S-boxes for C5 by two.
We emphasize that while our focus is on differential cryptanalysis, the proposed method
for efficiently modeling large S-boxes can directly be used in other contexts such as linear
cryptanalysis, impossible differential attack, zero-correlation attack, and integral attack.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 3.2, we explain how to model
the problem of finding the best differential characteristic for an SPN block cipher using MILP
and list the limitation of this approach. In Sect. 3.3, we present a new modeling of the DDT
of (large) S-boxes to efficiently optimize the probability of differential characteristics. The
proposed modeling is applied to two of the AES-round based constructions in Sect. 3.4. Finally,
the chapter is summarized in Sect. 3.5.
3.2 Existing MILP Modeling of an SPN block cipher
To automatically find the best differential characteristic of a(n SPN) block cipher, Sun et
al. [133,134] proposed describing the differential behavior of a block cipher as an MILP model.
The feasible region of such an MILP model should contain only the set of all valid differential
characteristics of the considered block cipher. To build such MILP model, binary variables xi
are assigned to each input and output difference bit of every operation used in the cipher, i.e.,
when xi = 1, this bit has a nonzero difference, and xi = 0 denotes no difference. The objective
function of this model would be to maximize the probabilities associated with the differential
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propagation through the different operations. If we use the negative of log base 2 of these proba-
bilities, then the objective function is to minimize these log values. As the difference propagates
deterministically through linear operations, the objective function involves the probabilities of
the differential propagation through non-linear operations. Then, the differential propagation
through each operation is described as a set of linear inequalities that are used as constraints in
this MILP model. For example, the differential propagation through the basic XOR operation
of two variables (x0  x1 = y0) can be described by the following linear inequalities:
x0 + x1   y0  0; x0   x1 + y0  0;  x0 + x1 + y0  0;  x0   x1   y0 + 2  0 (3.1)
When the block cipher employs a generic linear transformation, it can be represented as a
binary matrix and then converted to XOR operations involving multiple bits. When the block
cipher employs a permutation, similar to the ShiftRows operation utilized by AES, it can be
handled by simply permuting the binary bits of the internal state. In general, the modeling of
the differential propagation through linear operations is done in a straightforward manner and
the challenge is to model the differential propagation, i.e., the DDT of an S-box. To this end,
two approaches were presented: logical condition modeling and H-representation of the convex
hull.
Logical condition modeling. In this approach, general MILP ideas to model logical condi-
tions as linear inequalities are borrowed to describe the conditional differential properties of an
S-box. For example, it was observed in [137], that if the output difference of the S-box em-
ployed by the PRESENT block cipher [36] is (0101), then the least significant bit of the input
difference is always 0. This logical differential property can be modeled using the following
linear inequality:
 x3 + y0   y1 + y2   y3 + 2  0:
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where (x0; x1; x2; x3) and (y0; y1; y2; y3) are the MILP binary variables representing the input
and output difference bits, respectively, and x3 and y3 are the least significant bits.
H-representation of the convex hull. In this approach, the n input difference bits of every
valid differential propagation of the DDT of an S-box are concatenated with the correspond-
ing m output difference bits to form n + m bit vectors. The H-representation of the convex
hull, which is the smallest convex set containing these n + m vectors is calculated using Sage-
Math [60]. There might be redundancy in the linear inequalities returned by SageMath, hence,
in order to reduce this set of linear inequalities, a greedy algorithm was developed [134]. The
probability of each valid input-output difference pattern can be encoded into p bits and appended
to the n+m bit vectors before using SageMath to generate the H-representation of their convex
hull. This way, an exact upper bound on the probability of the differential characteristic can be
obtained.
One major shortcoming of the current approaches to model the DDT of an S-box is its ap-
plicability to large S-boxes, i.e., 8-bit S-boxes. This has been pointed out several times, for
example, Sun et al. wrote that “To the best of our knowledge, the MILP approach is unable to
search for actual differential characteristics of ciphers with 8  8 S-boxes” [132]. Sasaki and
Todo wrote “MILP requires too many inequalities to represent differential propagations in DDT
of 8-bit S-boxes” [127]. In the next section, we propose a new modeling approach to address
this limitation.
3.3 New MILP Modeling to Optimize Probability of Differ-
ential Characteristics
In our new model, we separate the DDT entries of an S-box according to the values of their
probabilities. Then, we treat each probability value as a Boolean function whose inputs are
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the input and output difference bits, i.e., this Boolean function evaluates to 1 when the input
difference goes to the output difference with that probability and 0, otherwise. This results in a
number of Boolean functions that equals the number of distinct probability values in the DDT.
Afterwards, each Boolean function is transformed to its reduced PoS form, which, in turn, is
represented by a set of linear inequalities. The sets of linear inequalities representing all the
Boolean functions symbolizing all the probability values of the DDT are combined together and
integrated into an MILP model that represents the differential propagation through the S-box.
The deterministic transition of zero input difference going to zero output difference is handled
a bit different. Instead of having a Boolean function dedicated to this transition, we assign a
binary variable that can be thought of as a flag. When this binary variable is off, i.e. set to zero,
the S-box is not active and the input and output difference bits are all set to zero. When the flag
is on, the S-box is active and one probability value along with input and output differences must
be chosen.
input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
output 5 3 4 6 2 7 0 1
Table 3.1: An arbitrary 3-bit S-box Representation (in decimal)
To illustrate our approach, we apply its steps on the arbitrary 3-bit S-box in Table 3.1 and
whose DDT is given in Table 3.2. Other than the deterministic zero input to zero output transi-
tion, there are two distinct probability values: 2 1 and 2 2. Each of these values will be assigned
a Boolean function symbolized by, e.g., p0 and p1. Then, the truth tables of these Boolean func-
tions are created. In Table 3.3, we show the entries of these truth tables where either p0 or p1
equals one and in all the omitted entries both p0 and p1 equal zero. Then, each Boolean function
is, individually, transformed to its reduced PoS form1. For example, the PoS of p0 is as follows:
1Logic Friday [102] is an example of an off-the-shelf software that can be used to minimize the PoS of a
Boolean function.
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p0 =(y1 _ y2) ^ (x1 _ x2) ^ (x1 _ x2) ^ (y1 _ y2) ^ (y0 _ y2)
^ (x0 _ y2) ^ (x2 _ y0) ^ (x0 _ x2) ^ (x0 _ x2 _ y0 _ y2);
where xi and yi denote the negation of xi and yi, respectively, i.e., xi = xi  1 and yi = yi  1,





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0
2 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0
3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 1
4 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1
5 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0
6 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0
7 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0
Table 3.2: The DDT of the 3-bit S-box given in Table 3.1
The above equation means that for p0 to be one, all the terms must equal 1, for instance from
the first term either y1 = 0 or y2 = 1 and from the last one either x0, x2, y0 or y2 is 0 and
similarly for all the other terms.
The next step is to represent these terms as linear constraints and this can be done by using
either implied constraints if the MILP solver has such constraint built-in or model them as
conditional constraints. The built-in implied constraint representing the last term would be:
p0 =1) (1  x0) + (1  x2) + (1  y0) + (1  y2)  1
p0 =1)  x0   x2   y0   y2   3
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x0 x1 x2 y0 y1 y2 p0 p1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Table 3.3: Binary tables for p0 and p1 for the 3-bit S-box DDT
and modeling it as a conditional constraint involve choosing a sufficiently large upper bound
(M) on those constraints (See section 7.4 in [29]). In our exemplary case, M would be chosen to
be six which is the number of input and output difference bits. Thus, the conditional constraint
of the same last term would be:
(1  x0) + (1  x2) + (1  y0) + (1  y2)  6p0 + 6  1
 x0   x2   y0   y2   6p0   9
In this last equation, if p0 is zero then x2, x0, y2 and y0 can be chosen freely while if p0
is 1 then this imposes the restriction that at least one of them must be 0. All the other terms
in p0 and p1 are represented by linear constraints in a similar manner. To handle the special
31
case of zero input difference going to zero output difference, we add a binary variable, e.g., f
which, as stated above, would be a flag to indicate whether the S-box is active or not. The linear
constraints for this would be as follows:
x0 + x1 + x2 + y0 + y1 + y2   f  0
f   xi  0
f   yi  0;
where 0  i  2
To indicate that only one of the probabilities along with the flag must be set we add the
following constraint:
p0 + p1   f = 0
Finally, the objective function of just one S-box will take the form:
Minimize: p0 + 2p1
3.4 Application to AES-Based Constructions
The well-understood security of AES and its efficient implementation have made it an appeal-
ing building block to construct other symmetric-key primitives such as MACs and AE schemes.
For the purpose of being more efficient and without sacrificing security, some primitives have
been built using a 4-round reduced version of AES making advantage of its wide-trail strat-
egy [53] which provides an adequate level of security for that number of rounds. However, and
due to a much more complicated security analysis, fewer schemes have been constructed using
less than four rounds.
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In their FSE 2016 paper, Jean and Nikolic´ have investigated the limits of building efficient
AES-based constructions without affecting their security [77]. They made use of the AES-NI
dedicated set of instructions available on almost any common processor nowadays with focus
on the aesenc instruction which executes one full AES round. To make sure that their schemes
have high efficiency, they have carefully studied and subsequently chosen the internal state size
and the number of aesenc calls per step and which state blocks should the aesenc instruction be
applied to.
On the other hand, they set the only security requirement of their constructions to be resistant
against internal collisions. Internal collisions in cryptographic primitives such as MACs and
AEs are normally based on a differential characteristic with high probability that starts and ends
with zero difference internal states after introducing some intermediate states differences using
the message blocks. As the maximum differential probability of the AES S-box is 2 6 and the
highest differential that can be used in an internal collision must avoid allowing a probability
higher than 2 128 (when the key size is 128 bits), this yields a lower bound on the number of
active S-boxes of d128=6e = 22.
To search for secure constructions whose best differential has a minimum of 22 active S-
boxes, Jean and Nikolic´ have used MILP as was done in [113]. They have shown seven secure
constructions that provide a good trade-off between state size and efficiency (see Figures 5-11
in [77]). The state size of these constructions ranges from 6-9 and 12 128-bit blocks. Two
constructions process three message blocks per step, i.e., an iteration of their designs, while the
others process two message blocks per step. In all these constructions, the AES round function
is applied on particular state blocks only once per step. This was found and proven to be more
efficient than cascading r AES round function calls.
However, Jean and Nikolic´ have noted the limitation of MILP-based search as follows:
Limitations. “Despite providing a simple and efficient way of finding differential
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characteristics, MILP only yields upper bounds on the actual probabilities of the
differential characteristics as, theoretically, they can be impossible. We empha-
size that this does not relate to impossible differential characteristic, but to the fact
that partially undetermined behavior of the XOR operation (mentioned before) may
result in inconsistent systems that produce truncated differential characteristics,
which are impossible to instantiate with actual differences. Fortunately, while a
cryptanalyst should ensure the validity of the produced characteristics, we, as de-
signers, only need to confirm that the upper bound on the probability of the best
differential characteristic is sufficiently low.”
This has motivated us to attempt instantiate two of their constructions using our new model.
To this end, we adopt the following two-stage search approach, similar to the one introduced by
Sun et al. [132] for constraint programming:
Stage 1. Using MILP as was done in [113], we search for all the truncated differentials that
have the minimum (or a predefined) number of active S-boxes. It is to be noted that
it is not known yet whether these truncated differentials can be instantiated with actual
differences or not.
Stage 2. We try to instantiate each truncated differential by using our new proposed model
while considering the positions of the active and non-active S-boxes.
3.4.1 Results on the Fifth Construction (C5)
C5 processes two message blocks per step with an internal state of seven 128-bit blocks and
the AES round function call is applied to five out of these seven blocks. The designers reported
that the minimum number of active S-boxes for this construction is 22 but without stating the
number of steps needed to reach it. Therefore, our first step was to find the truncated differentials
that achieve that minimum number of active S-boxes and in how many steps. We have found that
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there are only four truncated differentials that achieve the minimum number of active S-boxes
after four steps. On the chance that there might be other truncated differential characteristics
that have 22 active S-boxes but for larger number of steps. We ran the MILP model for five, six,
seven and eight steps and the number of differential characteristics did not change. All these
differentials were found to be infeasible. One of which is depicted in Figure 3.2. Verifying it
manually, for BX4 and DX4 to be of zero difference, bytes 12-15 of BX3, CX3, and M1 3
must be equal. As bytes 12-15 in BZ2 are zero, this means that these bytes also equal bytes
12-15 in M1 2, i.e., bytes 12-15 in BX3, CX3, M1 2, and M1 3 are equal. As AZ2 is all
zeros, this means that bytes BX2 must be inactive which contradicts the truncated differential.
Similar reasoning applies to the other three truncated differentials with 22 active S-boxes.
BXi CXi DXi EXi FXi GXiAXi
M1_i M1_i M1_i M1_i M2_i M2_i M2_i
Bxi+1 Cxi+1 Dxi+1 Exi+1 Fxi+1 Gxi+1Axi+1
A A A A A
Figure 3.1: C5 construction. ‘A’ represents one AES round function.
Then, we increased the number of active S-boxes and found 580 truncated differentials that
have 23 active S-boxes. Again, we verified that with higher number of steps, the number of
truncated differentials with 23 actives S-boxes does not change. All these truncated differentials
were found to be infeasible by the solver. One of these differentials is depicted in Figure 3.3.
We found that it is invalid because of the reasoning mentioned above, i.e., forBX4 andDX4 to
be of zero difference, bytes 13-15 ofBX2 should be inactive contradicting the differential char-
acteristic. Moreover, for GX4 to be of no difference, it requires that MC[0; a; 0; 0] from FZ2
to be equal to MC[b; 0; 0; 0] from FZ3 and this is not possible because there are no non-zero
differences at different positions that would yield the same output after the AES MixColumn,
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Figure 3.2: Invalid differential characteristic for C5 with 22 active S-boxes
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MC, operation.
This concludes that the lower bound on the number of active S-boxes for C5 is 24, and not
22 as early estimated by the designers.
BXi CXi DXi EXi FXiAXi
M1_i M1_i M2_i M2_i
Bxi+1 Cxi+1 Dxi+1 Exi+1 Fxi+1Axi+1
A A A AA A
Figure 3.4: C1 construction. ‘A’ represents one AES round function.
3.4.2 Results on the First Construction (C1)
C1 processes two message blocks per step with an internal state of 6 128-bit blocks and the
AES round function call is applied to all these 6 blocks. The minimum number of active S-
boxes reported by the designers is 22 with no stated number of steps. 256 truncated differential
characteristics were found to achieve that minimum number of active S-boxes after three steps.
We checked up to seven steps and the number of truncated differentials remained constant.
These 256 differential characteristics are formed by having one active byte in the first block of
both messages. We have applied our method on all of these differential characteristics and 252
were found by the solver to be infeasible. Figure 3.5 depicts one of these invalid differential
characteristics. We have verified manually that this characteristic is indeed invalid. As shown
in Figure 3.5, for AX3 to be of zero difference, this means that FZ2 must equal AX2 and as
AX1 is all zeros,AX2 equals FZ1. So, forAX3 to be of zero difference FZ1 = MC[0; a; 0; 0]
must equal FZ2 = MC[b; 0; 0; 0] and this is not possible as explained above. Following the
same logic, the truncated differential can be valid if and only if the active bytes are at the same
position and that position is not impacted by the shift row operation along the different steps,
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i.e., the active bytes of the first block of the two messages are at either (0, 0), (4, 4), (8, 8) or
(12, 12), i.e., the four truncated differentials found to be feasible by the solver.
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Figure 3.5: Invalid differential characteristic for C1
40
As the S-box is the same for every byte of the state and as the MC input will always have
the same format, the probability of these four differentials will be the same and the actual
differences will just be a permutation of each other. We have tried to instantiate one of these
four differential characteristics and it was found that the best probability is 2 134 instead of 2 132
which means that there are two S-boxes that cannot be bypassed by the maximum probability
of 2 6. These are the S-boxes at byte 8 of AX2 and EX2 (highlighted in yellow in Figure 3.6
and the actual difference values are listed in Table 3.4). Looking for the reason, we have found
that for the path to be valid, the input of the S-boxes at byte 8 of AX2 and BX2 (resp. EX2
and FX2) must be different and the output must be the same, i.e., S(a) = S(b) where are a,
b are two distinct non-zero differences. We have searched through the DDT of the AES S-box
and found that the maximum probability that would fulfill this condition is 2 13 , one S-box is
activated with 2 6 while the other is activated with 2 7. This means that the probability found
by the MILP solver is the highest probability. Therefore, we conclude that the best differential
characteristic of this construction has a probability of 2 134.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a new MILP modeling of the DDT of (large) S-boxes. At first,
the DDT is split into multiple tables according to the probability value. A Boolean function
is assigned to each value and then using some of the off-the-shelf software, its truth table is
converted to the minimum product of sums form. The latter is represented as a set of linear
inequalities that can efficiently describe the differential propagation through large S-boxes, i.e.,
8-bit S-boxes. With the proposed modeling, we evaluated the upper bound on differential char-
acteristics of two AES-round based constructions. We improved the lower number on active
S-boxes for one construction and improved the upper bound on the differential probability of
the other. Lastly, it is worth noting that the proposed modeling can be applied in other crypt-
analysis techniques such as linear cryptanalysis.
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Figure 3.6: Valid differential characteristic for C1
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State Values Probability State Values Probability
00 00 59 00
N/A
BX 1 00 00 59 00
N/A
M1 0 00 00 00 00 CX 1 00 00 00 00
M2 0 00 00 00 00 EX 1 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 FX 1 00 00 00 00
BY 1 00 00 A8 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ] BZ 1 00 00 4B 00
N/A
CY 1 00 00 00 00 [ 1 1 1 1 ] CZ 1 00 00 A8 00
EY 1 00 00 00 00 [ 1 1 1 1 ] EZ 1 00 00 A8 00
FY 1 00 00 00 00 [ 1 1 1 1 ] FZ 1 00 00 E3 00
00 00 12 00
N/A
00 00 4B 00
N/A
M1 1 00 00 A8 00 AX 2 00 00 A8 00
M2 1 00 00 A8 00 DX 2 00 00 A8 00
00 00 E3 00 00 00 E3 00
00 00 12 00
N/A
00 00 59 00
N/A
BX 2 00 00 A8 00 CX 2 00 00 00 00
EX 2 00 00 A8 00 FX 2 00 00 00 00
00 00 E3 00 00 00 00 00
AY 2
00 00 AA 00 [ 1 1 -7 1 ]
BY 2
00 00 AA 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ] 00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ] 00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
00 00 72 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ] 00 00 72 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
00 00 A8 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
DY 2
00 00 D0 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
CY 2 00 00 00 00 [ 1 1 1 1 ] 00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
FY 2 00 00 00 00 [ 1 1 1 1 ] 00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
00 00 00 00 [ 1 1 1 1 ] 00 00 72 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ]
EY 2
00 00 D0 00 [ 1 1 -7 1 ] A1 F8 4F 72
N/A
00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ] AZ 2 F8 59 AA 72
00 00 A1 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ] BZ 2 59 A1 AA 96
00 00 72 00 [ 1 1 -6 1 ] A1 A1 E5 E4
00 00 4B 00
N/A
A1 F8 BB 72
N/A
CZ 2 00 00 A8 00 DZ 2 F8 59 D0 72
FZ 2 00 00 A8 00 EZ 2 59 A1 D0 96
00 00 E3 00 A1 A1 6B E4
M1 2
A1 F8 4F 72
N/A M2 2
A1 F8 BB 72
N/A
F8 59 AA 72 F8 59 D0 72
59 A1 AA 96 59 A1 D0 96
A1 A1 E5 E4 A1 A1 6B E4
Table 3.4: 3-step differential characteristic for C1 with probability 2 134. Differences are repre-
sented by hexadecimal numbers. “Probability” shows logarithm of the probability of the S-box
differential transition in the corresponding byte of a particular state.
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Chapter 4
Improved Key Recovery Attack on
Round-reduced Hierocrypt-L1 in the
Single-Key Setting
In this chapter, we analyze the security of the Hierocrypt-L1 block cipher against MitM at-
tack. Hierocrypt-L1 is a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit key. It was selected among the
Japanese e-Government 2003 recommended ciphers list and has been reselected in the 2013
candidate recommended ciphers list. In this chapter, we cryptanalyze Hierocrypt-L1 in the
single-key setting. In particular, we construct a five S-box layer distinguisher that we utilize to
launch a MitM attack on eight S-box layer round-reduced Hierocrypt-L1 using the differential
enumeration technique. Our attack allows us to recover the master key with data complexity of
249 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2114:8 eight S-box layers Hierocrypt-L1 encryptions
and memory complexity of 2106 64-bit blocks. This is the first cryptanalysis result that reaches
eight S-box layers of Hierocrypt-L1 in the single-key setting.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [4].
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4.1 Introduction
Hierocrypt-L1 (HC-L1) [48, 120, 148], designed by Toshiba Corporation in 2000, is a 64-bit
block cipher with a 128-bit key. The cipher employs a nested SPN structure [120], where each
S-box in the higher SPN level encompasses a lower-level SPN structure. It was submitted to
the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE) project [116].
In 2003, it was selected as one of the Japanese e-Government recommended ciphers [46], and
its security was reaffirmed by CRYPTREC in 2013 where it was included in the candidate
recommended ciphers list [45].
The best-known attack on HC-L1 in the single-key setting is the square attack on seven S-
box layers which was proposed by the designers [121] and independently by Barreto et al. [14].
Later, Cheon et al. proposed a four S-box layers impossible differential [148] and utilized it
to attack HC-L1 reduced to six S-box layers. In the related-key setting, Taga et al. utilized a
differential characteristic in the key scheduling of HC-L1 to attack eight S-box layers [136].
In this chapter, we assess the security of HC-L1 against Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks. First,
we construct a five S-box layers truncated differential characteristic for HC-L1. Then, we utilize
this characteristic as a distinguisher to launch a MitM attack based on the differential enumer-
ation technique against HC-L1 reduced to eight S-box layers. Unlike the majority of existing
MitM attack results, the matching step in our attack is performed around the linear transforma-
tion. Particularly, in the offline phase, we compute two specific bytes of the input of the linear
transformation and store their XOR in a precomputation table. Then, in the online phase, we
compute two particular bytes of the output of that linear transformation, compute their XOR,
which is equivalent to the XOR of the two input bytes, and look for a match in the precomputa-
tion table. If no match is found, the key is discarded. Our attack recovers the master key with
data complexity of 249 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2114:8 eight S-box layers HC-L1
encryptions and memory complexity of 2106 64-bit blocks.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a description of HC-L1
and the notation adopted in this chapter. Section 4.3 describes our five S-box layers distinguisher
and how it is used to launch our MitM attack to recover the master key. Then, the chapter is
summarized in Section 4.4.
4.2 Specification of Hierocrypt-L1
HC-L1 is an iterated block cipher that operates on 64-bit blocks and uses a 128-bit key. It
adopts a nested SPN construction, which embeds a lower level SPN structure within a higher
SPN one. It has six rounds where the last round is slightly different than the others. As shown
in Figure 4.1, the higher SPN level of HC-L1 consists of the following three operations:
 AK: Mixes a 64-bit layer key with the 64-bit internal state.
 XS: Two 32  32-bit keyed substitution boxes that are applied simultaneously to the
internal state.




1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
The lower SPN level, i.e., the two 32 32-bit XS-boxes, as shown in Figure 4.1, comprises
of:
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Figure 4.1: One round of Hierocrypt-L1
 SB: A nonlinear byte bijective mapping layer which applies the same 8-bit S-box eight
times in parallel.
 MC: A diffusion layer consisting of a byte-wise linear transformation defined by a 4 4
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) [106, 126] matrix called mdsl .
 AK: The 64-bit layer key is divided into halves and each half is mixed with the 32-bit
internal state of one XS box.
 SB: Another nonlinear byte bijective mapping layer which applies the same 8-bit S-box
eight times in parallel.
Each round of HC-L1 includes two S-box layers. The last round of HC-L1 is an output
transformation where the MS linear operation is substituted by an XOR with a layer key. The





1 ]  ((SB  AK[K(6)2 ] MC  SB)  AK[K(6)1 ])
     (MS  (SB  AK[K(1)2 ] MC  SB)  AK[K(1)1 ])(P )
To facilitate the understanding of our attacks, we represent the internal state of HC-L1 as a
4 2 matrix, as depicted in Figure 4.2, where each 8-bit word in the ith row and the jth column
of this matrix represents a state byte. Consequently, MC, similar to the MixColumns operation
in AES, operates column-wise and MS affects the entire matrix. Moreover, we exploit the fact
that both the linear transformations (MC, MS), and the key addition AK are linear and swap
their order. In such case, the input data is first XORed with an equivalent layer key, denoted
by EKi, and then the linear transformation is applied. The equivalent layer key at any given
S-box layer i is evaluated by EKi = MC 1(Ki) when i is odd and EKi = MS 1(Ki) when i
is even. In addition, we use the following property of the S-box:
Proposition 4.1 (Differential Property of a bijective S-Box ”S”) Given i and o two non-
zero differences in F256, the equation: S(x) + S(x + i) = o has one solution on average.
This property also applies to S 1.
Key schedule. The input to the key schedule is the 128-bit master key and the output is 13 64-
bit layer keys (1 key per S-box layer in addition to the final key). The master key initializes the
first key state denoted by V ( 1)1(32)kV ( 1)2(32)kV ( 1)3(32)kV ( 1)4(32) which then undergoes eight rounds relying
on a Feistel construction and linear transformations to generate the layer keys where the first
round is a bit special as it omits a linear function and does not produce any layer keys. Then,
depending on the employed function, the other rounds form two groups, which we mark as ‘type
A’ and ‘type B’. The two 32-bit key state words V3(32) and V4(32) are updated linearly in each
round, while the other two 32-bit key state words V1(32) and V2(32) are updated using a Feistel


















Figure 4.2: Alternative representation of one round of Hierocrypt-L1











2(32)  V (r 1)1(32) ;F(V (r 1)2(32)  V (r)3(32)); r = 0; 1;    ; 7
where L is a linear function and the function F is a level of S-boxes succeeded by another linear
transformation. Then, the 64-bit layer keys K(r)1(64) (k
(r)




















































Figure 4.3: One Round of Hierocrypt-L1 key schedule
generated in every round of ‘type A’ as follows:
k
(r)
1(32)  V (r 1)1(32)  F(V (r 1)2(32)  V (r)3(32)); (4.1)
k
(r)
2(32)  V (r)3(32)  F(V (r 1)2(32)  V (r)3(32)); (4.2)
k
(r)
3(32)  V (r)4(32)  F(V (r 1)2(32)  V (r)3(32)); (4.3)
k
(r)
4(32)  V (r)4(32)  V (r 1)2(32) ; r = 0; 1;    ; 7 (4.4)
The round function of ‘type B’ is almost equivalent to the inversion of the ‘type A’ round
function but the linear function that operates on V3(32) and V4(32) is different. It is to be noted
that in our attacks, we number the layer keys sequentially fromK1 up toK13 whereKi = K
di=2e
1(64)
when i is odd and Ki = K
di=2e
2(64) when i is even.
For further details regarding the S-box, the linear transformations or the key schedule, the
reader is referred to [148].
The following notations are used throughout this chapter:
 xi: The internal state at the input of layer i
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 yi: The internal state after the SB of layer i.
 zi: The internal state after the MC (resp. MS) of layer i when i is odd (resp. even).
 z0i: The internal state after the AK of layer i with an equivalent key EKi.
 xi[j]: The jth byte of the state xi, where j = 0; 1;    ; 7, and the bytes are indexed as
described in Figure 4.2.
 xi[j    k]: The bytes between the jth position and kth position of the state xi.
 xi,xi[j]: The difference at state xi and byte xi[j], respectively.
 X(n): An n-bit word X . Such notation is specifically used in describing the key schedule.
The memory and time complexities of our attack are measured as 64-bit HC-L1 blocks and
round-reduced HC-L1 encryptions, respectively.
4.3 A Differential Enumeration MitM Attack on HC-L1
Generally, in a MitM attack, a round reduced block cipher EK is split into three successive
parts, such that EK = E2K2  Em  E1K1 , where Em exhibits a distinguishing property. The
exploited property is used to identify the correct key by checking whether each guess of subkey
(K1; K2) yields the property or not. In our attacks, we use a truncated differential characteristic
as the distinguishing property, such that its input is a -set [50] captured by Definition 4.1. While
in most of the published MitM attacks the matching is performed around a specific byte or word,
adopting such approach on HC-L1 requires a time complexity that exceeds the key exhaustive
search. Therefore, as explained in details below, we opt for matching on a single equation that
relates two input bytes of the linear transformation MS with two bytes at its output.
Definition 4.1 (-set of HC-L1) Let a -set be a set of 256 HC-L1 states that are all different
in one state byte (the active byte) and all equal in the other state bytes (the inactive bytes).
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In our MitM attack, we use the five S-box layers distinguisher embedded in the truncated
differential characteristic, illustrated in Figure 4.4. It starts at x2 and ends at the input of the
linear transformation MS of layer 6, i.e., z06. We exploit the simplicity of the MS operation by
observing the below equations of two of its output bytes:
zi[0] = yi[0] yi[2] yi[4] yi[5] yi[6] (4.5)
zi[7] = yi[0] yi[2] yi[4] yi[6] yi[7] (4.6)
Therefore, from (4.5) and (4.6), we have:
zi[0] zi[7] = yi[5] yi[7] (4.7)
Consequently, it follows that x7[0]x7[7] = z06[5] z06[7] (see Figure 4.4) which is the single
equation upon which the matching is performed as will be explained in the attack procedure.
Proposition 4.2, below, is the core of our attack.
Proposition 4.2 If a message m belongs to a pair of states conforming to the truncated differ-
ential characteristic of Figure 4.4, then the ordered sequence of differences z
0
6[5]  z06[7]
obtained from the -set constructed from m in x2[3] is fully determined by the following 14
bytes: x2[3]; x2[3]; x3[1; 3; 4; 6]; y5[4    7]; y6[5]; y6[7]; y6[5] and y6[7].
Proof. The proof is based on rebound-like arguments adopted from the cryptanalysis of hash
functions [111] and used in [58]. Assuming that (m; m0) is a pair that follows the truncated
differential characteristic in Figure 4.4. In the sequel, we manifest that knowing these specific 14
bytes is sufficient to compute the ordered sequence of differences z06[5]z06[7]. To conform
to the differential characteristic in Figure 4.4, the 14 bytes x2[3]; x2[3]; x3[1; 3; 4; 6]; y5[4   
7]; y6[5]; y6[7]; y6[5] and y6[7] can take 2813 = 2104 possible values only. This is because
y6[5] must equaly6[7] in order to result in a difference in just x7[0; 7]. Then for each of these
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Figure 4.4: The differential characteristic used in the MitM attack on HC-L1 using differential
enumeration. Offline bytes are colored in black while online bytes are colored in gray.
 The value x2[3] with the difference x2[3] enable us to bypass the S-box of layer 2 and
then propagate the difference linearly through MS to compute x3[1; 3; 4; 6].
 By knowing x3[1; 3; 4; 6], we can bypass the S-box of layer 3 to reach y3, then linearly
through MC to compute x4[0    7].
 Similarly in the other direction, the differences y6[5] and y6[7] with the values y6[5]
and y6[7] enable us to bypass the S-box of layer 6 and compute the difference z5[5; 7],
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then linearly through MC 1 we compute y5[4    7].
 By knowing y5[4    7], we bypass the S-box of layer five to compute z4[4    7] and
then linearly through MS 1 we can compute y4[0    7].
 Now, we have the differences x4[0    7] and y4[0    7]. Hence, by the differential
property of the HC-L1 S-box (Proposition 4.1), there is, on average, one solution for each
of the eight bytes of x4.
To build the ordered sequence for each of the 2104 possible values of the 14 bytes from propo-
sition 4.1, we consider all the 28   1 possible values for the difference x2[3] and propagate
them until z06 with the help of the internal state solutions we have. This creates an ordered
sequence of 28   1 differences in z06[5; 7].
Attack Procedure. Similar to other MitM attacks, our attack has 2 phases; an offline phase
and an online phase that result in recovering the 64-bit last layer key K9, 2 bytes of EK8 =
MC 1(K8) and 4 bytes of K1.
Offline Phase. In the offline phase, we compute all the 2104 values of z06[5]  z06[7] de-
termined by the 14 bytes listed in proposition 4.1 and store them in a precomputation table
T .
Online Phase. The online phase can be divided into two stages; data collection and key re-
covery. The data collection stage aims at finding pairs of messages that follow the truncated
differential characteristic in Figure 4.4. Then, for each of the found pairs, a -set is created, its
corresponding ordered sequence is computed and tested for a match in T to identify the correct
key in the key recovery stage.
Data collection. To generate one pair of messages that conforms to the eight S-box layers
truncated differential characteristic in Figure 4.4, the encryption oracle is queried with struc-
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tures of chosen plaintexts. In a given structure, bytes [0    3] take all the 232 possible values
while the other four bytes are fixed to some, possibly different, constants and hence, each struc-
ture generates 232  (232   1)=2  263 pairs. Our eight S-box layers truncated differential
characteristic has a probability of 2 338 18 = 2 80 because of the three 4 ! 1 transitions
over MC in addition to the probability that x7[0] equals x7[7], marked as a in Figure 4.4.
Consequently, in order to find one pair that follows our chosen 2 80 probability truncated dif-
ferential characteristic, 280 pairs are needed which is equivalent to 280 63, i.e., 217 structures of
232 messages, each. Briefly, 217+32 = 249 messages are sent to the encryption oracle to generate
the required 280 pairs. It is to be noted that the distinguisher was chosen to start at x2[3] because
this specific byte results into just four differences, i.e., z2[1; 3; 4; 6] after the application of the
MS transformation (cf. 4th column of MDSH).
Key Recovery. The key bytes: K9[0    7], EK8[0; 7] and K1[0    3] can take 2(2+1+1)8 =
232 possible values for each of the 280 pairs. This is justified as follows:
 The difference y7[0; 7] is guessed and propagated linearly through MC to compute
x8[0    7].
 The difference y8[0    7] is equal to the difference x9[0    7] which, in turn, is the
difference in the ciphertext pair.
 As we have the difference x8[0    7] and y8[0    7], the differential property of the S-
box is used to deduce a solution for each byte of x8 and y8 which yields 216 key candidates
for the whole K9 by simply XORing y8 with the ciphertext.
 Then, x8[0    7] is propagated linearly through MC 1 to deduce z07[0    7].
 Afterwards, the difference y6[5; 7] which, as explained before, assumes 28 values only
is guessed and propagated through MS to get the difference x7[0; 7].
 As we have x7[0; 7] and y7[0; 7] were already guessed in the first step above, the
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differential property of the S-box is used to deduce a solution for y7[0; 7] which with
z
0
7[0    7], computed above, enables us to deduce 28 candidates for EK8[0; 7].
 Next, the differencex2[3] is guessed and propagated linearly throughMC 1 to compute
y1[0    3].
 The difference x1[0    3] is actually the difference in the plaintext pair. Therefore,
knowing the differences x1[0    3] and y1[0    3] enables us to deduce 28 candidates
for K1[0    3] using the differential property of the S-box.
Overall, guessing four bytes helps deduce 14 key bytes. In other words, these 14 key bytes
have just 232 possible values for each of the 280 pairs. Then, in order to recover the key, we
enumerate each of the 280 candidate pairs we obtained in the data collection stage and deduce
the corresponding 232 possible key suggestions. Next, we build the plaintext -set and compute
its corresponding ordered sequence of x7[0]  x7[7] and look for a match in T and if no
match is found, this key suggestion is discarded.
A valid ordered sequence can be generated by a wrong key with a negligible probability,
280+32+104 2558 = 2 1824, which can be relaxed. Therefore, we use the partial sequence match-
ing idea proposed in [11]. Instead of matching 28  1 bytes ordered sequence, we match b bytes
such that b < 28 and the probability of error, chosen to be 2 32, is still small enough to be
able to identity the right key. In that case, the number of required bytes b is calculated by
2 32 = 280+32+104 8b yielding b = 31. Therefore, it is enough to match 31 bytes of the ordered
sequence to identify the right key with a negligible error probability of 2 32.
So far, we have recovered 14 key bytes; the eight bytes of K9, two bytes of EK8 and four
bytes of K1. To recover the master key, 6 bytes of EK8 are guessed to get 248 suggestions for






























3(32)  F(V (4)2(32)  V (5)3(32)) (4.11)
Then, the 32-bit V (3)2(32) is guessed and V
(4)
4(32) is computed from equation (5) and, in turn,
V
(4)
3(32) is deduced from equation (4). According to the key schedule, the knowledge of V
(4)
3(32)


























4(32). As we recover one full intermediate state of
the key schedule and its round is bijective, we can recover the master key and get 248 candidates
for the master key corresponding to the 248 K8 suggestions. The correct master key is found by
exhaustively searching through these 248 candidates using two plaintext/ciphertext pairs with no
significant impact on the overall time complexity of the attack.
Attack Complexity. The size of the precomputation table T created in the offline phase de-
termines the memory requirement of the attack. T contains 2104 ordered sequences, each of
8  31 = 248 bits by using the partial sequence matching technique. Therefore, the memory
complexity of the attack is 2104  248=64  2106 64-bit blocks. The data collection stage of
the online phase sets the data complexity of the attack to 249 chosen plaintexts. The offline
phase time complexity to build T is attributed to executing 2104 partial encryptions on 32 mes-
sages, which is equivalent to 2104+5  11=(8 8) = 2106:46 encryptions. The online phase time
complexity to recover 14 key bytes is determined by the time needed to partially decrypt the 25
values in a -set with all the 232 key suggestions for all the 280 generated pairs which is equiv-
alent to 280+32+5  (4 + 10)=(8  8) = 2114:8. Finding the correct master key among the 248
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candidates using two plaintext/ciphertext pairs requires 2  248 = 249 encryptions. Therefore,
the time complexity of the attack is equivalent to 2114:8 + 2106:46 + 249  2114:8.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have analyzed one of the Japanese e-Government 2013 candidate rec-
ommended block ciphers; Hierocrypt-L1 using the MitM attack in the single-key setting. Our
attack employs the differential enumeration technique and is launched against eight S-box layers
using a five S-box layers distinguisher. The attack recovers the master key with data complexity
of 249 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2114:8 eight S-box layers Hierocrypt-L1 encryptions
and memory complexity of 2106 64-bit blocks. This is the first attack on Hierocrypt-L1 in the





In this chapter, we investigate the resistance of the Hierocrypt-3 block cipher against MitM
attacks. Hierocrypt-3 is an SPN block cipher designed by Toshiba Corporation. It operates
on 128-bit state using either 128, 192 or 256-bit key. In this chapter, we present two meet-
in-the-middle attacks in the single-key setting on the eight S-box layer reduced Hierocrypt-3
with 256-bit key. The first attack is based on the differential enumeration approach where we
propose a truncated differential characteristic in the first six S-box layers and match a multiset
of state differences at its output. The other attack is based on the original meet-in-the-middle
attack strategy proposed by Demirci and Selc¸uk at FSE 2008 to attack reduced versions of both
AES-192 and AES-256. For our attack based on the differential enumeration, the master key is
recovered with data complexity of 2113 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2238 8 S-box layer
reduced Hierocrypt-3 encryptions and memory complexity of 2218 128-bit blocks. The data,
time and memory complexities of our second attack are 232, 2245 and 2239, respectively. These
are the first attacks on eight S-box layer reduced Hierocrypt-3.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [1].
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5.1 Introduction
Hierocrypt-3 (HC-3) [47, 120, 148], designed by Toshiba Corporation in 2000, is a 128-bit
block cipher that was submitted to the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and En-
cryption (NESSIE) project [116]. It is among the Japanese e-Government 2003 recommended
ciphers list [46] and the 2013 candidate recommended ciphers list [45]. HC-3 employs a nested
SPN structure as proposed in [120]. In a nested SPN structure, each round has two substitution
layers with distinct linear transformations and hence is equivalent to two rounds in normal SPN
structure.
In the self-evaluation report done by Toshiba Corporation [148], HC-3 was concluded to
be sufficiently secure against all well-known attacks at that time. Nevertheless, Barreto et al.
presented an improved square attack against reduced round HC-3 [14]. They showed that HC-
3 is vulnerable up to six S-box layer for 128-bit key, and up to seven S-box layer for 192,
256-bit keys. These attacks are the best attacks on HC-3 so far. Then, Cheon et al. presented
a four S-box layer impossible differential that can be used to attack up to 6 S-box layer of
HC-3 [81]. Furuya and Rijmen analyzed the key scheduling of HC-3 and showed many linear
relations between the round key bits [128]. Finally, after the introduction of the biclique attack
in 2011 [35], Rechberger evaluated the security of HC-3, among other 128-bit block ciphers,
against the biclique attacks [125].
In this chapter, we present two Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on HC-3; the first attack uses the
idea of efficient differential enumeration while the second one utilizes the plain MitM attack in a
data-memory trade-off approach. Contrary to AES, HC-3 alternates between two distinct linear
transformations; the first linear transformation, similar to the MixColumns transformation in
AES, operates on 4 bytes while the other linear transformation acts on the whole 16-byte state.
Nevertheless, we manage to construct a six S-box layer truncated differential characteristic that
we use to mount an attack on 8 S-box layer reduced HC-3. In the second attack, we show that if
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the input has one active byte in a specific position then after four S-box layers of HC-3, certain
bytes of the output can be described by a function of that active byte parameterized by 30 8-bit
parameters. We use this 4 S-box layer distinguisher to attack 8 S-box layer reduced HC-3 as
well with much less data complexity but higher memory and time complexities.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we give the specification of
HC-3 and provide the notation used throughout this chapter. Section 5.3 discusses the attack
based on the efficient differential enumeration technique where we describe the chosen trun-
cated differential characteristic and the adopted attack procedure. Afterwards in Section 5.4,
we provide a brief description of our plain MitM attack on HC-3. Finally, we summarize the
chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Specification of Hierocrypt-3
HC-3 is an iterated nested SPN block cipher that operates on 128-bit states with either 128,
192 or 256-bit key. As described in the previous chapter, in a nested SPN structure, the low
level SPN structure is recursively used in the SPN of the higher level. That is, one large S-box
is composed of two substitution layers with smaller S-boxes and one linear transformation in
the middle of them. Therefore, one round in a nested SPN structure has two substitution layers
and hence corresponds to two rounds in a normal SPN structure. The number of rounds in HC-3
varies with the cipher key size. For 128-bit keys, HC-3 has six rounds, for 192-bit keys there are
seven rounds, and for 256-bit keys, eight rounds. In all cases, the last round is slightly different
from the other rounds.
At the higher SPN level, an HC-3 round, as shown in Figure 5.1, consists of three transfor-
mations:
 X: A subkey mixing layer consisting of XORing the 128-bit input with 16-byte subkey.
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Figure 5.1: One round of Hierocrypt-3.
 XS: A layer of four parallel 32 32-bit keyed substitution boxes.
 H: A linear transformation consisting of XORing 8-bit subdata xi(8)(2 GF (2)8; i =
0; 1;    15), which is represented by a matrix MDSH . The matrix MDSH and its in-
verse MDS 1H are given in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.
At the lower SPN level, each 32 32-bit XS-box consists of:
 S: A nonlinear layer composed of simultaneous application of four 8-bit S-boxes.
 L: A byte-wise linear transformation defined by a 4  4 matrix called mdsl. L has a
branch number of five, i.e., when the input (resp. output) has 1 active byte then the output
(resp. input) must have 4 active bytes.
 X: A subkey mixing layer consisting of XORing the 32-bit input with 4-byte subkey.
 S: Another nonlinear layer composed of simultaneous application of four 8-bit S-boxes.
Hence, each round consists of two S-box layers and in our attacks below, the counting is






















1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0









































0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1




















Figure 5.3: The MDS 1H matrix
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In the last round, the H transformation is replaced by a post-whitening key addition. Hence,
the full encryption function of the 256-bit key version of HC-3 where the ciphertext C is evalu-
ated from the plaintext P can be described as:
C =X[K
(9)
1 ] ((S X[K(8)2 ]LS)X[K(8)1 ])     (H  (S X[K(1)2 ]LS)X[K(1)1 ])(P )
For the convenience of describing our attacks, we use a different representation of HC-3, sim-
ilar to the alternative expression used in [81]. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, the state is represented
as a 4  4 matrix where each cell in the matrix represents a state byte. In this representation,
mdsl operates column-wise, similar to the MixColumns operation in AES, and MDSH acts
on the whole matrix. In some cases, we are also interested in swapping the order of the linear
transformations, either H or L, and the XOR with the key X . These operations are linear and
hence they can be interchanged, by first XORing the input with an equivalent key and then ap-
plying the linear transformation. The equivalent subkey at S-box layer i is denoted by Ui where
Ui = L
 1(Ki) when i is odd or Ui = H 1(Ki) when i is even. Additionally, we rely on the
differential property of a bijective S-box stated in proposition 4.1.
Key schedule. The key state Z1kZ2kZ3kZ4 is 256-bit and undergoes 10 rounds to generate
the 17 keys used in the 16 S-box layers in addition to the final key. The first key state is denoted
by Z( 1)1 kZ( 1)2 kZ( 1)3 kZ( 1)4 and instantiated with the master key. The first round is special as
it omits a linear function and does not generate any round key. The other rounds can be split
into two groups which we denote by G1 and G2. We focus our description on G1 as it is used
to generate the round keys from S-box layer 1 up to S-box layer 10, which covers our attacked
S-box layers. The key state words Z3 and Z4 are updated linearly every round, while Z1 and Z2





















Figure 5.4: Alternative representation of one round of Hierocrypt-3.



















1  F(Z(r 1)2  Z(r)3 )
where L1 is a specific linear transformation and the function F consists of a level of S-boxes



















































Figure 5.5: 1 Round of Hierocrypt-3 key schedule.





















where r = 1; 2;    ; 5 then the 128-bit K(r)1(128) is set to k(r)1 kk(r)2 and K(r)2(128) is set to k(r)3 kk(r)4 .
It is to be noted that in our attacks, we number the keys sequentially from K1 up to K17 (for the
full cipher) where Ki = K
di=2e
1(128) when i is odd and Ki = K
di=2e
2(128) when i is even.
For further details regarding the S-box, the linear transformations or the key schedule, the
reader is referred to [148].
5.2.1 Notation
The following notations are used throughout this chapter:
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 xi; yi: The 16-byte state after the X;S transformations at layer i, respectively.
 zi: The 16-byte state after the linear transformation at layer i where the linear transfor-
mation is L (resp. H) when i is odd (resp. even).
 xi[j]: The jth byte of the state xi, where j = 0; 1;    ; 15, and the bytes are indexed as
shown in Figure 5.4.
 xi[j    k]: The bytes between the jth position and kth position of the state xi.
 xi; xi[j]: The difference at state xi and byte xi[j], respectively.
We measure memory complexity of our attacks in number of 128-bit HC-3 blocks and time
complexity in reduced-round HC-3 encryptions.
5.3 A Differential Enumeration MitM Attack on HC-3
Recall that in a MitM attack, an r-round reduced block cipher is split into 3 consecutive parts
of r1, r2 and r3 rounds, r = r1 + r2 + r3, such that a particular set of messages may verify a
certain property in the middle r2 rounds. In an offline phase, that particular property is evaluated
independently of the keys used in the middle rounds. Then in an online phase, correct key
candidates for the r1 and r3 rounds are checked whether they verify this distinguishing property
or not. In our attacks, the chosen property is a truncated differential characteristic, such that
when its input is a -set [50] captured by Definition 5.1, the set of each byte of the output
states forms an ordered sequence or rather a multiset as in Dunkleman’s attack and captured in
Definition 5.2.
Definition 5.1 (-set of HC-3) Let a -set be a set of 256 HC-3 states that are all different in
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Figure 5.6: The distinguisher used in the MitM attack on HC-3 using differential enumeration.
Definition 5.2 (Multisets of bytes) A multiset generalizes the set concept by allowing elements
to appear more than once. In our case, a multiset of 256 bytes can take
0B@ 28 + 28   1
28
1CA
 2506:17 different values.
Our first proposed eight S-box layer MitM attack relies on a 6 S-box layer distinguisher. The
distinguisher, as illustrated in Figure 5.6, starts at x1 and ends at the S-box transformation in
layer 6, i.e., y6. Proposition 5.1, below, is the core of our attack.
Proposition 5.1 If a message m belongs to a pair of states conforming to the truncated differ-
ential characteristic of Figure 5.6, then the multiset of differencesy6[3] obtained from the -set
constructed from m in x1[0] is fully determined by the following 27 bytes: y1[0], x2[0    3],
x3[0    15], y6[3], y6[3] and y5[0    3].
Proof. As before, the proof uses rebound-like arguments borrowed from the hash function
cryptanalysis [111] and used in [58]. Let (m; m0) be a right pair that conforms to the trun-
cated differential characteristic in Figure 5.6. We show in the following how the knowledge of
these 27 particular bytes is enough to compute the multisets. The 27 bytes y1[0], x2[0    3],
x3[0    15], y6[3], y6[3] and y5[0    3] can take 2827 = 2216 possible values, and for each of
them, we can determine the values of all the differences shown in Figure 5.6. y1[0] can be
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propagated linearly through L to compute x2[0    3]. With the knowledge of x2[0    3], we
can bypass the S-box of layer 2 to reach y2, then linearly through H to compute x3[0    15].
With the knowledge of x3[0    15], we can bypass the S-box of layer 3 to reach y3 and then
linearly through L to compute x4[0    15]. Similarly in the other direction, y6[3] and y6[3]
enable us to bypass the S-box of layer 6 and computez5[3], then linearly through L 1 we com-
pute y5[0    3]. With the knowledge of y5[0    3], we bypass the S-box of layer 5 to compute
z4[0    3] and then linearly through H 1 we can compute y4[0    15]. By the differential
property of the HC-3 S-box (Proposition 4.1), there is, on average, one solution for each of the
16 bytes of the state x4.
To construct the multiset for each of the 2216 possible values of the 27 bytes from proposition
5.1, we consider all the 255 possible values fory1[0] and propagate them until y6 with the help
of the internal state solutions we have. This results in a multiset of 255 differences iny6[3]. As
the HC-3 S-box is a permutation over F256, the sequence iny1[0] allows to derive the sequence
in x1[0].
Attack Procedure. Our attack recovers the 128-bit last round key K9 and 13 bytes of U8 =
L 1(K8) and is composed of a precomputation phase and an online phase.
Precomputation phase. In the precomputation phase, we iterate over the 2216 possible values
for the 27 bytes of proposition 5.1 and for each of them, we deduce the possible values of the
internal states as discussed in the above proof. These internal state values are then used to
generate the multiset. We store all the multisets in a hash table.
Online Phase. The online phase is further divided into two steps; data collection and key
recovery. First, we try to find pairs of messages that conform to the truncated differential char-
acteristic in Figure 5.7 in which the previous 6 S-box layer characteristic is placed at the top.
Next, the found pairs are used to create a -set and test them against the stored hash table to
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identify the correct key.
Data collection. In this step, we query the encryption oracle with structures of chosen plain-
texts to get enough pairs such that one conforms to the eight S-box layer truncated differential
characteristic in Figure 5.7. Each structure is composed of 28 plaintexts, where byte 0 takes all
the 28 possible values while each of the other 15 bytes take any, possibly distinct, fixed value.
Thus, each structure is expected to generate 28  (28   1)=2  215 pairs. The probability that
the truncated differential characteristic is verified is 2 78 88 = 2 120 because of the 16 ! 9
transition over L 1 (x8 ! z07) and the 9 ! 1 transition over H 1 (x7 ! z06), see Figure 5.7.
While the probability of the former transition over L 1 is trivial to deduce, the probability of
the latter transition over H 1 was deduced by observing that if the input of H 1 consists of
certain nine active bytes having the same difference, then the output will have just one active
byte in a specific position. This position can be either 3; 7; 11 or 15 depending on the position
of the 9 bytes. Hence, the probability of the 9 ! 1 transition is equivalent to the probability
of 9 active bytes having the same difference, i.e., 28=289 = 2 88 = 2 64. This observation
is also applicable to H , but the positions of the nine active input bytes and the active output
byte differ from the ones corresponding to H 1. Since the probability of the whole truncated
differential characteristic is 2 120, then in order to find one pair that conforms to it, we need
2120 pairs which means 2105 structures of 28 messages. Therefore, we ask for the encryption of
2105+8 = 2113 messages to get the required 2120 pairs.
Key Recovery. For each of the 2120 pairs, we get 28(1+9) = 280 suggestions for the 25 key
bytes: K9[0::15] andU8[1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15]. This is done as follows: we guessy7[1; 3    6;
8; 10; 13; 15] and propagate it linearly through L to compute x8. From the other side, x9 is
in fact the difference in the ciphertext pair and is also equal to y8. So now, we have x8 and
y8, so we use the differential property of the S-box and get a solution for each byte of x8 and
y8, which enables us to deduce a key candidate for the whole K9 by XORing the ciphertext
with y8, which in turn, helps compute z
0
7. Then, we guess y6[3] and propagate it through H to
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get x7[1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15]. Once again, we use the differential property of the S-box along
with y7[1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15] which we guessed above to deduce a solution for the 9 bytes
y7[1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15] which with z07 enables us to compute the corresponding 9 bytes in U8.
To summarize this part, we guess 10 bytes that help deduce 25 key bytes.
To compute the multiset at y6[3] which is equivalent to z
0
6[3], we noticed that extra key
bytes are required. For example, if byte 3 is active in state yi then, throughH , it has an impact on
9 bytes in state zi, these 9 bytes are [1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15] (cf. 4th column inH). However, byte
3, through H 1, is impacted by 11 bytes in state zi, these 11 bytes are [0; 2    6; 8    10; 12; 13]
(cf. 4th row inH 1). Hence, to compute the multiset, we need to guess the key bytes [0; 2; 9; 12]
on top of the above deduced keys. These key bytes are the gray cells in Figure 5.7. This means
that for each of the 2120 pairs, we have 280+48 = 2112 key candidates. For each pair and for
every key candidate, we build the plaintext -set, get the corresponding ciphertexts, compute
the multiset and look for a match in the precomputation table. If a match is not found, we
can discard that key candidate. The probability of a wrong key producing a valid multiset is
given by 2120+112+216 467:6 = 2 19:6 which is negligible. Note that the probability of randomly
having a match in the table is 2 467:6 (and not 2 506:7) because the number of ordered sequences
associated to a multiset is not constant [58].
Now, our attack recovers the 16-byte K9 and 13 bytes of U8, which is the equivalent key of
K8 so, in order to recover the master key, we guess 3 bytes of U8 and get 224 candidates for K8.


















































































































































Figure 5.7: Complete eight S-box layer truncated differential characteristic used in the attack
using differential enumeration.
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3  F(Z(4)2  Z(5)3 ) (5.4)
We start by guessing Z(3)2 which is of 64-bit length then from equation (5.2) we compute Z
(4)
4 .





us to compute Z(5)3 and Z
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we compute Z(4)2 . We use equation (5.4) as a 2























4 we can recover
the master key and get 224 candidates for the master key corresponding to the 224 candidates for
K8. We exhaustively search through these master key candidates to find the correct master key
with no significant impact on the attack time complexity.
Attack Complexity. The memory requirement of the attack is due to the precomputation table
needed to store 2216 multisets, each of 512 bits. Hence, the memory complexity of the attack
is 2216  512=128 = 2218 128-bit blocks. The data complexity of the attack is attributed to
the data collection step of the online phase where we query the encryption oracle with 2113
chosen plaintexts to generate 2120 pairs. The time complexity of the offline phase to construct
the table is due to performing 2216 partial encryptions on 256 messages, which is equivalent to
2216+8  2 2 = 2222 encryptions. The time complexity of the online phase to recover 29 key
bytes (16-byte K9 and 13 bytes from U8) is the time required to partially decrypt the 28 values
in a -set with all the 2112 key candidates for all the 2120 generated pairs, which is equivalent
to 2120+112+8  2 2 = 2238. The time complexity of the exhaustive search among the 224
master key candidates using two plaintext/ciphertext pairs is 2  224 = 225. Therefore, the
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Figure 5.8: The four S-box layer distinguisher used in the MitM attack on HC-3 using Demirci
and Selc¸uk approach.
time complexity of the attack is dominated by the time complexity of the online phase and is
equivalent to 2238 + 2222 + 225  2238.
5.4 A plain MitM Attack on HC-3
Our second proposed MitM attack on HC-3 is also launched on eight S-box layer of the 256-
bit key version in a data-memory trade-off approach. Although its memory and time complexi-
ties, as will be shown, are higher than the previous attack by a factor of 221 and 27, respectively,
it reduces the data complexity dramatically by a factor of 281. It follows the strategy used by
Demirci and Selc¸uk, which we named above as the plain MitM. As illustrated in Figure 5.8, the
distinguisher in this attack covers four middle S-box layers starting from x2 to x6. Proposition
5.2 is the base of our attack.
Proposition 5.2 The ordered sequence of differencesx6[2] obtained from the -set constructed
by varying x2[3] is fully determined by the following 30 bytes: x2[3], x3[1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15],
x4[0    15] and x5[0    3].
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 5.1 without using the rebound-like
arguments. We show in the following how the knowledge of these 30 particular bytes is enough
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to compute the ordered sequence of differences at x6[2]. x2[3] and x2[3] help us bypass the
S-box of layer 2 to compute y2[3] which is then propagated linearly through H to compute
x3[1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15]. With the knowledge of x3[1; 3    6; 8; 10; 13; 15], we can bypass
the S-box of layer 3 and then linearly through L, we computex4[0    15]. With the knowledge
of x4[0    15], we can bypass the S-box of layer 4 and once again linearly through H , we
compute x5[0    15]. With the knowledge of x5[0    3], we can bypass the S-box of layer 5
in these 4 bytes to reach y5[0    3] and then linearly through L to compute x6[2]. The byte
where the distinguisher starts was chosen such that it minimizes the number of parameters.
x2[7; 11; 15] are other possible positions that would result in the same number of parameters.
The byte where the ordered sequence is computed was chosen to minimize the number of key
guesses in the online phase. x6[6; 10; 14] are other positions that would require guessing the
same number of key bytes.
Attack Procedure. In this attack, we recover the 16-byte K9, 9 bytes of U8 = L 1(K8),
1 byte of U7 = L 1(K7) and 4 bytes of K1. Similar to the previous attack, this one is also
composed of a precomputation phase and an online phase. The precomputation phase in this
attack is similar to the precomputation phase in the previous one, we build a hash table for the
ordered sequence of x6[2] by iterating over all the possible values of the 30 parameters. The
online phase is a bit different and thus explained in details below.
Online Phase. In the online phase, we choose an arbitrary plaintext as P 0, guess 4 key bytes
K1[0    3] and partially encrypt P 0 through the first layer to reach z1. We create the -set at
z1[3], which is equivalent to creating the -set at x2[3], and decrypt it backward to identify the
plaintexts forming the -set containing P 0 and ask for their corresponding ciphertexts. From
these ciphertexts and by guessing 26 key bytes, we compute the ordered sequence of x6[2]
and look for a match in the stored hash table. The 26 key bytes to be guessed are K9[0    15],
U8[0; 1; 3; 6; 7; 10; 11; 13; 15] and U7[2] as depicted in Figure 5.9. The probability for a false














































Figure 5.9: The online phase of the eight S-box layer MitM attack on HC-3 using Demirci and
Selc¸uk approach.
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we try 2240 key candidates, we expect that only 2240 1800 = 2 1560 remain after this step. We
notice that the probability of a wrong key producing a valid 28   1 bytes ordered sequence
is negligible and can be relaxed. Hence, we use the partial sequence matching idea proposed
in [11]. Instead of matching 28   1 bytes ordered sequence, we match b bytes such that b < 28
and the probability of error, chosen to be 2 32, is still small enough to be able to identity the
right key. In that case, the number of required bytes b is calculated by 2 32 = 2830+240 8b,
which yields b = 64. This means that it is enough to match 64 bytes of the ordered sequence
to identify the right key with a negligible error probability of 2 32. It should be noted that in
this attack, we opted for using the ordered sequence rather than the multiset because in the case
of multiset, the probability of error is not small enough to identify the right key. Finally, as we
recover 9 bytes from U8, we have 256 candidates for K8 and following the same approach as in
the previous attack, we get 256 candidates for the master key, which we exhaustively search to
retrieve the correct master key with no major impact on the overall attack time complexity.
Attack Complexity. The memory requirement of the attack is due to the precomputation table
needed to store the partial ordered sequence and is estimated to be 224064=128 = 2239 128-bit
blocks. The data complexity of the attack is 232 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity of the
offline phase is equivalent to 2240  65  2 2  2244 encryptions. The time complexity of the
online phase to recover 30 key bytes (The 16-byte K9, 4 bytes from K1, 9 bytes from U8 and 1
byte from U7) is equivalent to 2240  65  2 2 = 2244. Therefore, the total time complexity of
the attack is 2244 + 2244 + 257  2245.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented two MitM attacks on the 256-bit key version of one of the
Japanese e-Government candidate recommended block ciphers, i.e., Hierocrypt-3. The first at-
tack employs the differential enumeration technique while the second one follows the strategy of
Demirci and Selc¸uk. Both attacks are mounted against eight S-box layers and the complexities
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of the first attack are 2113 chosen plaintexts, 2238 8 S-box layer reduced Hierocrypt-3 encryp-
tions and 2218 128-bit blocks of memory. The other attack has much less data complexity of 232
chosen plaintexts but higher time and memory complexities of 2245 encryptions and 2239 128-bit
blocks, respectively. We have noticed that the first attack based on the differential enumeration
technique works in the chosen ciphertext context as well with exactly the same data, time and




Impossible Differential Attacks on
SPARX-64/128
In this chapter, we present an impossible differential attack on SPARX-64/128 which is an
ARX-based block cipher with 64-bit block size and 128-bit key. It was published in ASI-
ACRYPT 2016 as one of the instantiations of a family of ARX-based block ciphers with prov-
able security against single-characteristic differential and linear cryptanalysis. In particular, we
present 12 and 13-round impossible distinguishers on SPARX-64/128 that can be used to attack
15 and 16-round SPARX-64/128 with post-whitening keys, respectively. While the 15-round
attack starts from round zero, the 16-round one, exploiting the key schedule, has to start from
round two.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [5].
6.1 Introduction
SPARX is a family of ARX-based block ciphers that was published in ASIACRYPT 2016 [62].
It was designed with the goal of putting forward a general strategy for designing ARX-based
symmetric-key primitives with provable security against single-characteristic differential and
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linear cryptanalysis. As a dual to the wide trail strategy [51, 52] adopted by many S-box based
block ciphers, the designers proposed the long trail strategy. This strategy promotes the use of
a rather weak but large S-box, i.e., an ARX-based S-box, along with a very light linear layer.
Fostering the existence of long trails, that involve an uninterrupted sequence of calls to the S-
box interleaved with key additions, rather than having maximum diffusion in each linear layer
is at the core of this proposed strategy. The long trail strategy allowed the designers to bound
the maximum differential and linear probabilities for any number of rounds of a block cipher
designed following such strategy. SPARX-64/128 is a member of this family of block ciphers
following the long trail strategy with 64-bit block size and 128-bit key. The only cryptanalysis
of SPARX was done by its designers as they presented a 13-round bit-based division property
distinguisher that they used to launch an integral attack against 15-round SPARX-64/128 [63].
No other attacks were given in the short/full versions of the design paper.
In this chapter, we present a 12-round truncated Impossible Differential on SPARX-64/128
that can be extended to a 13-round impossible differential with a specific input difference and a
truncated output difference. We use the 12-round impossible differential to launch an impossible
differential attack against 15-round SPARX-64/128 including the post-whitening key with data
complexity of 251 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 294:1 15-round encryptions and memory
complexity of 243:5 64-bit blocks. Then, we use the 13-round impossible differential to attack
16-round SPARX-64/128, including the post-whitening key, starting from round 2 with data,
time and memory complexities of 261:5 known plaintexts, 294 16-round encryptions, and 261:5
64-bit blocks, respectively.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, the notation used
throughout this chapter are given followed by the specification of SPARX-64/128. Our impos-
sible differentials are presented in Section 6.3. Afterwards, in Section 6.4, we provide a detailed
description of our impossible differential attacks on SPARX-64/128. Finally, Section 6.5 sum-
marizes the chapter.
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6.2 Description of SPARX-64/128
The following notations are used throughout this chapter:
 K: The master key.
 ki: The ith 16-bit of the key state, where 0  i  7.
 kji : The ith 16-bit of the key state after applying the key schedule permutation j times,
where 0  i  7 and 0  j  17 for SPARX-64/128.
 RK(a;i): The 32-bit round key used at branch a of round i where 0  i  24 and a = 0
(1) denotes the left (right) branch of SPARX-64/128.
 X(a;i) (Y(a;i)): The left (right) 16-bit input at branch a of round i where 0  i  24, a = 0
(1) denotes the left (right) branch of SPARX-64/128, and the LSB of either X(a;i) or Y(a;i)
is on the right.
 w: The number of 32-bit words, i.e., w = 2 for a 64-bit block and w = 4 for a 128-bit
master key.
 R3: The iteration of three rounds of SPECKEY with their corresponding key additions.
 Lw: Linear mixing layer used in SPARX with w-word block size, thus L2 represents the
linear mixing layer used in SPARX-64/128.
 : Addition mod 216.
 : Bitwise XOR.
 n q (o q): Rotation of a word by q bits to the left (right).
 k: Concatenation of bits.
 0xabcd: A 16-bit number in hexadecimal representation.
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6.2.1 Specifications of SPARX-64/128
SPARX [62, 63] is a family of ARX-based SPN block ciphers. It follows the SPN design
strategy while using ARX-based S-boxes instead of S-boxes based on look-up tables. ARX-
based S-boxes form a specific category of S-boxes that rely solely on addition, rotation and
XOR operations to provide both confusion (non-linearity) and diffusion. The SPARX family
adopts the 32-bit SPECKEY ARX-based S-box, shown in Fig. 6.1, which resembles one round
of SPECK-32 [15, 16] with only one difference, that is, the key is added to the whole 32-bit













Figure 6.1: The SPECKEY ARX-based S-box used in the SPARX family.
For a given member of the SPARX family whose block size is n bits, the plaintext is divided
into w = n=32 words of 32 bits each. Then, the SPECKEY S-box (S), being applied to w words
in parallel, is iterated r times interleaved by the addition of independent subkeys. Then, a linear
mixing layer (Lw) is applied to ensure diffusion between the words. The structure made of a key
addition followed by S is called a round while the structure made of r rounds followed by Lw
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is called a step, as depicted in Fig. 6.2. Thus, the ciphertext corresponding to a given plaintext
is generated by iterating such steps. The number of steps and the number of rounds in each step

















































Figure 6.2: SPARX structure
SPARX-64/128 is the lightest member of this family operating on 64-bit blocks using 128-
bit keys. It uses three rounds in each step and iterates over eight steps, i.e., the total number
of rounds is 24. More precisely, in SPARX-64/128, 2 SPECKEY S-boxes (S) are iterated
simultaneously 3 times, while being interleaved by the addition of the round keys and then a
linear mixing layer (L2) is applied, as shown in Fig. 6.3. The structure of L2 is depicted in the






































Figure 6.3: One step of SPARX-64/128
Key schedule. The 128-bit master key instantiates the key state, denoted by k00kk01kk02kk03kk04
kk05kk06kk07 . Then, the 332-bit round keys used in the left branch of the first step are extracted.
Afterwards, the permutation illustrated in Fig. 6.5 is applied and then the 3 32-bit round keys
used in the right branch of the first step are extracted. The application of the permutation and the
extraction of the keys are interleaved until all the round keys encompassing the post-whitening
ones are generated. This means that, first, the round keys of a branch of a given step j are
generated and then the key state is updated. The following observation on the key schedule is
exploited in our attacks.
Observation: The last round key of a given step and the first round key of the subsequent step




























Figure 6.4: One round and linear layer of SPARX-64/128
zero and the first round key of step one. The 64-bit round key of the third round is k04kk05; k14kk15









7  2 = k05  2, k30 = k26 = k14 and k30 = k17  3 = k15  3.
Finally, it is to be noted that we measure the memory complexity of our attacks in number





































































Figure 6.5: SPARX-64/128 key schedule permutation, where the counter r is initialized to zero.
6.3 Impossible Differentials of SPARX-64/128
A 12-round impossible differential is readily noticeable when considering SPARX-64/128 to
be a twisted variant of a Feistel construction where the two halves undergo a keyed function
before getting mixed and swapped. Indeed, as depicted in Fig. 6.6, if the left branch of SPARX-
64/128 at round i has a zero difference while the right half has a nonzero difference, then after
2 steps (6 rounds), the input at the left branch must have a nonzero difference. From the other
direction, if the input of the right branch of round i+ 12 has a nonzero difference, i.e,   and the
input of the left branch at that round has a difference L2( ), then after the linear transformation,
the right branch will have a zero difference which propagates unaltered for 2 complete steps (6
rounds) and contradicts with the forward differential at the left branch.
This 12-round truncated impossible differential can be extended to a 13-round distinguisher
with a specific input difference and truncated output difference. This is feasible by exploiting
the fact that there exist differentials with probability 1 for one SPECKEY round and one of






















































































Figure 6.6: 12-round impossible differential SPARX-64/128
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is chosen to be 0x8000 0x8000 then by propagating it backward through L2 we have the same
difference at both the right and left branches as an output for the S-box and this output difference
corresponds to the input difference 0x0040 0x0000 with probability 1. Hence, the input of the
13-round distinguisher is 0x0040 0x0000 and 0x0040 0x0000 while the output is still truncated
in the form of L2( ) and  .
6.4 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of SPARX-64/128
The 12 and 13-round impossible distinguishers described above can be used to attack 15 and
16-round SPARX-64/128, respectively. Both attacks include the post-whitening key, however,
the 16-round attack starts at round two.
6.4.1 15-round Impossible Differential Attack on SPARX-64/128
In this attack, we have chosen to place the 12-round distinguisher at the top, end it with a
specific difference that meets the constraint of L2( ) and  , and then append 3 rounds that have
a high probability as shown in Fig. 6.7. That specific difference at the end of the distinguisher
and the three analysis rounds were found using MILP. More specifically, we have followed the
guidelines in [69] to create an MILP model that describes SPARX-64/128 and solved it using
the publicly available MILP optimizer Gurobi [71]. The detailed procedure of the attack is
described as follows.
Data Collection. We first choose 2m structures of plaintexts where in each structure the left 32





  263 pairs of plaintexts, therefore we have 2m  263 = 2m+63
pairs of plaintexts in total. We encrypt these pairs and keep the ones whose ciphertext difference
matches the difference shown in Fig. 6.7. The probability of such ciphertext difference is about
2 64, therefore the expected number of remaining pairs after this phase is about 2m+63 64 =
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2m 1.
Key Recovery. To verify if the pairs generated during the data collection phase follow our
12-round impossible differential, we need to guess RK(0;15); RK(1;15); RK(0;14); RK(1;14), and
RK(0;13). However, as pointed out above, RK(0;15); RK(1;15) are related to RK(0;14); RK(1;14).











































































Figure 6.7: 15-round impossible differential attack on SPARX-64/128
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Step 1. For all the ciphertext pairs obtained in the data collection phase, we guess the 64-bit
round keys RK(0;15) and RK(1;15), decrypt round 15 and check if the difference matches
the one shown in Fig. 6.7. If it is not the case, the pair is discarded. The probability of
this event is 2 7 and thus after this step the expected number of remaining pairs is about
2m 1 7 = 2m 8.
Step 2. We deduce RK(0;14) and RK(1;14) from the guessed RK(0;15) and RK(1;15), decrypt round
14 and check if the difference is the expected one according to Fig. 6.7. If it is not the
case, the pair is discarded. The probability of this event is 2 4 and therefore the expected
number of pairs surviving this step is about 2m 8 4 = 2m 12.
Step 3. We guess the 32-bit RK(0;13) and partially decrypt the left branch of round 13 and check
if the difference meets the impossible differential difference. Once it is correct, we delete
the 32-bit round key guesses of RK(0;13) since such a differential is impossible; each
round key guess that proposes such a difference is a wrong key. After analyzing all the
2m 12 remaining pairs, we output the 96-bit round keys guess of RK(0;15), RK(1;15), and
RK(0;13) as a candidate. The probability that the pairs pass this step is about 2 2, therefore
the time complexity of this step is the number of key guesses  2 messages in each pair
 the probability that the key guess is excluded after sequentially testing it against all the
surviving pairs.
The steps of the key recovery phase are described in Table 6.1, whereas the second column
gives the round keys to be guessed in the corresponding round for each attack step. The third
column presents the number of surviving pairs after each step, and the fourth column is the time
complexity of each step measured in 15-round encryption.
Attack complexity. To balance the attack complexity between the different phases, we set
m = 19. This means that after analyzing all the remaining pairs, there will be about 296  (1 
2 2)2
m 12
= 296  (0:75)128  242:9 remaining candidates for the 96-bit round keys. Then, we
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Attack step Guessed keys # Surviving pairs Time complexity
1
RK(0;15) 2m 1 7 = 2m 8 264  2 2m 1  1=15  2m+60:1
RK(1;15)
2 y 2m 8 4 = 2m 12 264  2 2m 8  1=15  2m+53:1
3 RK(0;13) –
296  2 [1 + (1  2 2) + (1  2 2)2
+   + (1  2 2)2m 12 ] 1=(2 15)
Table 6.1: Key recovery process of the attack on 15-round SPARX-64/128. y: No additional
key guesses needed, i.e., the round keys are deduced from the previously guessed ones.
guess the 32-bit RK(1;12) which along with the surviving candidates allows us to recover the
master key K via the key schedule. Afterwards, we test each one of these master key candidates
using two plaintext/ciphertext pairs to find the correct master key. The time complexity of this
exhaustive search step is 2 232 242:9 = 275:9. Therefore the time complexity is dominated by
step 3 of the attack and estimated to be 2962(1=2 2)(1=30)  294:1. The data complexity of
the attack is 219+32 = 251 chosen plaintexts. The memory complexity of the attack is dominated
by the memory that is required to store the keys to be excluded, i.e., 242:996=64  243:5 64-bit
blocks.
6.4.2 16-round Impossible Differential Attack on SPARX-64/128
Although each round of SPARX-64/128 uses a 64-bit round key, there exists three specific
rounds that contain only 296 bits of key information as exemplified by the ones exploited in
the previous attack. Nonetheless, any four rounds contain at least 128 bits of key information.
Therefore, our 16-round attack on SPARX-64/128 has to start from round two and in this case,
we use the 13-round impossible differential and prepend 3 rounds on its top as shown in Fig. 6.8.
Again, we have used the Gurobi optimizer to find these three rounds after creating the MILP
model that describes them.
In this attack, we do not use data structures as they do not generate enough pairs to launch






















































































Figure 6.8: 16-round impossible differential attack on SPARX-64/128




  2122 pairs. Out of these
pairs, we would have 2122 64 = 258 pairs that satisfy the plaintext difference shown in Fig. 6.8.
Then, as the difference at the end of the distinguisher is the difference in the ciphertext, we have
to filter the ciphertexts such as the right branch is a nonzero difference   and the left branch
difference is L2( ) which means that we have 258 32 = 226 proper pairs.
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In the key recovery phase, which we perform on these 226 pairs, the 3 round keys take 296
values only and they are guessed on steps to reduce the time complexity of the attack as listed
in Table 6.2. It is to be noted that, according to the key schedule, RK(0;3), RK(1;3) are deduced
from the guessed RK(0;2), RK(1;2) and that RK(1;4) is deduced from RK(0;3).
Attack step Guessed keys # Surviving pairs Time complexity
1
RK(0;2) 226 8 = 218 264  2 226  1=16 = 287
RK(1;2)
2 y 218 9 = 29 264  2 218  1=16 = 279
3 y 29 2 = 27 264  2 29  1=(2 16) = 269
4 RK(0;4) –
296  2 [1 + (1  2 2) + (1  2 2)2
+   + (1  2 2)27 ] 1=(2 16)
Table 6.2: Key recovery process of the attack on 16-round SPARX-64/128. y: No additional
key guesses needed, i.e., the round keys are deduced from the previously guessed ones.
After analyzing all the remaining pairs, there will be about 296  (1   2 2)27 = 296 
(0:75)128  242:9 remaining candidates for the 96-bit round keys. Then, we guess the remain-
ing 32 bits of the master key and test each one of these master key candidates using 2 plain-
text/ciphertext pairs to find the correct one. The time complexity of this exhaustive search step
is 2232242:9 = 275:9. Therefore the time complexity is dominated by step 4 of the attack (see
Table 6.2) and estimated to be 296  2  (1=2 2)  (1=32) = 294. The data complexity of the
attack is 261:5 known plaintexts. In this case, the memory complexity of the attack is dominated
by the hash table [107] that is used to store the plaintexts while generating the required pairs,
i.e., 261:5 64-bit blocks.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have analyzed SPARX-64/128 against the impossible differential attack.
We have presented 12 and 13-round impossible differential distinguishers that are used to attack
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15 and 16-round SPARX-64/128 with the post-whitening key, respectively. The (data complex-
ity in chosen/known plaintexts, time complexity in 15/16-round encryptions, memory complex-
ity in 64-bit blocks) of these attacks are (251; 294:1; 243:5) and (261; 294; 261:5), respectively. This
is the first third-party cryptanalysis of SPARX-64/128.
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Chapter 7
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of
8-round Kiasu-BC
In ASIACRYPT 2014, TWEAKEY, a framework for unifying the design of tweakable block
ciphers was proposed. Kiasu-BC is one of the instantiations of this framework, which can be
considered as tweakable AES-128. It reuses the same round function and key schedule of AES-
128, the only difference is the addition of a 64-bit tweak to the first two rows of every round
key. In their security analysis, the designers concluded that the security of Kiasu-BC is identical
to AES-128 when it comes to impossible differential attacks and truncated differential attacks.
In this chapter, we show that an 8-round impossible differential attack on Kiasu-BC is feasible.
We adopt one of the existing impossible differential distinguishers on AES-128 and exploit the
tweak to gain this extra round in comparison to the impossible differential attacks on AES-128.
7.1 Introduction
The notion of tweakable block ciphers was first proposed by Liskov, Rivest and Wagner
[101]. In addition to the usual plaintext and secret key inputs of conventional block ciphers,
a tweakable block cipher accepts a third input called the “tweak”. The tweak is public and
provides variability similar to the role of an initialization vector in the cipher block chaining
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(CBC) mode or a nonce in the offset codebook (OCB) mode. The design of tweakable block
ciphers is normally done such that tweaks can be changed efficiently in comparison to the key
setup, which makes tweakable block ciphers a good base to build secure modes of operation.
The advantage of building tweakable block ciphers from conventional block ciphers is two-
fold. First, the extra cost of turning a block cipher implementation into a tweakable one is
small. Second, a tweakable block cipher would presumably inherent the trust and the thorough
security analysis of its underlying block cipher.
The TWEAKEY framework for unifying the design of tweakable block ciphers was proposed
by Jean et al. [78, 79]. They have put forward three specific instances of their framework,
namely, Deoxys-BC, Joltik-BC, and Kiasu-BC. The latter is the standardized AES-128 block
cipher turned into a tweakable block cipher. This is achieved by accepting, in addition to the
usual inputs of AES-128, a 64-bit tweak T that is XORed to the first two rows of every round
key. In other words, if T is set to zero, then Kiasu-BC is AES-128.
The impact of introducing the tweak on the security of Kiasu-BC was first studied by its de-
signers in their authenticated encryption scheme proposal [80] submitted to the ongoing CAE-
SAR competition [39]. The focus of their security analysis was to evaluate the security of Kiasu-
BC against the related-key related-tweak differential attacks and the met-in-the-middle attacks.
For the first, they showed that no 7-round differential characteristic would have a probability
higher than 2 128. For the latter, they concluded that the same attacks existing for AES-128
applies to Kiasu-BC. For the remaining types of attacks, they have argued that the security level
of Kiasu-BC stays the same. In particular, for the impossible differential attacks, the designers
stated: “The impossible differential attacks on AES do not exploit the key schedule, neither do
the truncated differential attacks, and therefore the number of rounds that they can penetrate
would remain the same” [80]. The first third-party analysis of Kiasu-BC was done by Dobrau-
nig, Eichlseder and Mendel [66], where they studied the security of Kiasu-BC against Square
attacks [50] and exploited the tweak to build a 4-round Square-based distinguisher which they
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used to launch a 7-round attack on Kiasu-BC with significantly better complexities than the best
published attacks on 7-round of AES-128.
The impossible differential attack was mounted on AES for the first time by Biham and
Keller [24], where they presented a 4-round impossible differential distinguisher that is com-
posed of two deterministic differentials that contradict in the middle. A notable improvement
of their attack was achieved by Bahrak and Aref [13] and, independently, Wentao, Wenling, and
Dengguo who extended the attack to 7-round AES-128 by using a different 4-round impossible
differential distinguisher and by adding 3 analysis rounds. These attacks were improved by Lu
et al. [103] by utilizing the early abort technique and exploiting the key schedule relations. They
were further improved by Mala et al. [107] by presenting a different 4-round impossible differ-
ential distinguisher and making use of the redundancy in the key schedule in a more lucrative
way.
In this chapter, we present an Impossible Differential attack on 8-round Kiasu-BC by carry-
ing over the previous techniques employed in attacking AES-128 and leveraging the freedom
in the choice of the tweak. Specifically, in addition to using the early abort technique, the pre-
computation tables and structures of plaintexts, we exploit the tweak to add one more analysis
round. Our attack requires 2116:64 chosen plaintexts encrypted using two tweaks, i.e., 2117:64
chosen plaintexts-tweaks combinations and has a time complexity equivalent to 2118:97 8-round
encryptions and uses 2101:64 128-bit memory blocks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we briefly describe the specifications of
Kiasu-BC in Section 7.2. Then, we present our impossible differential distinguisher in Section
7.3, followed by the key-recovery attack on 8-round Kiasu-BC in Section 7.4. Finally, we
summarize this chapter in Section 7.5.
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7.2 A Brief Description of Kiasu-BC
Kiasu-BC is a tweakable block cipher, which uses a 64-bit tweak to define a different specific
keyed instance of AES-128, i.e., if the tweak is set to 0, then Kiasu-BC is identical to AES-128.
Thus, similar to AES-128, the internal state of Kiasu-BC is represented as a 4  4 matrix that
undergoes 10 rounds of the following five transformations:
 SubBytes (SB) where the 8-bit AES S-box is applied simultaneously to the 16-byte in-
ternal state.
 ShiftRows (SR) where row i of the internal state is rotated left by i bytes, 0  i  3.
 MixColumns (MC) where each column of the internal state is multiplied by an MDS
matrix defined over the finite field GF (28).
 AddroundKey (AK) where the internal state is XORed to the 128-bit round key RKi
generated by applying the AES-128 key schedule on the 128-bit master key.















Figure 7.1: Tweak addition to the round key in Kiasu-BC
Additional AK and AT transformations are applied in the first round and the MC operation
is omitted from the last round. As both the AK and AT transformations are linear, we merge
them into one transformation that we refer to as AKT , where ki is the XOR of the round key
RKi and the tweak T in round i, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
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The input of the AES-128 key schedule is the 128-bit master key and it outputs 128-bit 11
round keys. The keys are arranged in an array denoted by W [0; : : : ; 43], where each word of
W [:] is 32 bits and corresponds to a column in the round key. The master key is placed as the
first 4 words ofW [:]. The other words ofW are generated according to the following algorithm:
 For i = 4; : : : ; 43, do:
– If i  0 mod 4 then W [i] = W [i  4] SB(W [i  1]n 8)RCON [i=4], where
RCON [:] is an array of predetermined constants andn n denotes rotation of the
word by n bits to the left,
– otherwise, W [i] = W [i  1]W [i  4].
In this chapter, we use xi; yi; zi; and wi to denote the 16-byte internal state in round i after
the AKT; SB; SR; and MC operations, respectively, where 1  i  10. xi[j] denotes the jth
byte of xi, where 0  j  15, as shown in ki in Figure 7.1. The bytes located in positions
j; k; l; : : : of xi are denoted by xi[j; k; l; :::]. The differences in xi and xi[j] are denoted by xi
and xi[j], respectively. Finally, in some cases, we are interested in interchanging the order
of the MC and the AK transformations. The involved operations are linear and hence they
can be interchanged by first XORing the data with an equivalent round key, applying the MC
transformation and then XORing with the tweak. In these cases, ui = MC 1(RKi) is used to
denote the equivalent round key.
7.3 An Impossible Differential Distinguisher of Kiasu-BC
In our attacks, we utilize messages that are encrypted using the same secret key but two
different tweaks that have any arbitrary nonzero difference in byte 0 and zero difference in the
other bytes. We adopt the impossible differential distinguisher that was used in [107] and make
the necessary adjustments due to the presence of the tweak difference. Hence, our impossible
differential distinguisher states that given a pair of w2 with six active bytes distributed on 2
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columns as shown in Figure 7.2, w5 cannot have nonzero difference in byte 0 and zero difference
in the other 15 bytes. The reason is that, even with the presence of the tweak difference, the
six active bytes in w2 will result in an entirely inactive column of w3. From the other side, the
active byte w5[0] will result in, at least, 12 active bytes in x4 and will contradict with certainty
with w3 in bytes 4, 6 and 7 (The bytes marked with X in both w3 and x4 in Figure 7.2). It is to
be noted that there are another two patterns for the six active bytes in w2 that will be exploited
in our attack. These two patterns will be elaborated when discussing the attack procedure and
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Figure 7.2: Impossible differential distinguisher of Kiasu-BC
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7.4 Impossible Differential Key-recovery Attack on 8-round
Kiasu-BC
We mount our attack against 8-round Kiasu-BC using the previous impossible differential
distinguisher, prepending two rounds and appending three rounds, as depicted in Figure 7.3.
First, we build five types of precomputation tablesH1; H2;i; H3;j; H4; H5 that would help extract
the key bytes k0[2; 7; 8; 13], k1[10], k1[8], k8[0; 7; 10; 13] u7[0], respectively. These tables are
built as follows:
H1: For all the about 248 possible pairs of (w1[8; 9; 10; 11]; w01[8; 9; 10; 11]) which have
zero difference in bytes [9; 11] and nonzero difference in bytes [8; 10], compute the values of
(x1[2; 7; 8; 13]; x
0
1[2; 7; 8; 13]). The computed pairs are stored in H1 indexed by x1[2; 7; 8; 13].
H1 has 232 rows and on average about 2
48
232
= 216 pairs lie in each row.
H2;i, i = 1; 2; 3: For all the about 232 possible pairs of (x2[0; 10]; x02[0; 10]) which have
nonzero difference in these two bytes, compute w2[0; 1; 2; 3]. Then, for i = 1; 2; 3 choose the
pairs (x2[0; 10]; x02[0; 10]) who lead to a zero difference in byte i of w2[0; 1; 2; 3]. This is an
8-bit filtration so the expected number of such pairs is 2322 8 = 224. These pairs are stored in




= 1 pair lie in each row.
H3;j; j = 8; 9; 11: For all the about 232 possible pairs of (x2[2; 8]; x02[2; 8]) which have
nonzero difference in these two bytes, compute w2[8; 9; 10; 11]. Then, for j = 8; 9; 11 choose
the pairs (x2[2; 8]; x02[2; 8]) who lead to a zero difference in byte j of w2[8; 9; 10; 11]. This
is an 8-bit filtration so the expected number of such pairs is 232  2 8 = 224. These pairs are
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Figure 7.3: Impossible differential attack on 8-round Kiasu-BC
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In the attack, each of the three tables H3;j can be used together with only one of the three
tablesH2;i, hence we denoteH3;conj(i) as the conjugate ofH2;i, where for i = 1; 2; 3, the conj(i)
are 11, 8, 9, respectively. In comparison to [107], we have excluded a fourth table because that
table, with the presence of the tweak difference, would not lead to a deterministic impossible
differential. The chosen position of the tweak difference determines which table to exclude. In
our attack, the tweak difference is chosen at position 0 and therefore we do not include the table
where i = 0, and j = 10.
H4: There are (28  1) possible values of z7[0], consequently, there are the same num-
ber of x8[0] values (after changing the order of the MC and the AK operations). Then, for
all the 232  (28   1)  240 possible pairs of (x8[0; 1; 2; 3]; x08[0; 1; 2; 3]), compute the values of
(z8[0; 7; 10; 13]; z
0
8[0; 7; 10; 13]). These pairs are stored in H4 indexed by z8[0; 7; 10; 13]. H4
has 232 rows and on average about 2
40
232
= 28 pairs lie in each row. Here, we restrict the position
of z7 to match the position of the tweak difference.
H5: To follow our chosen differential path, x7 has one possible value only, i.e., the
difference in the tweak. So, for all the 28 possible pairs of (x7[0]; x07[0]), compute the values of
(z7[0]; z
0
7[0]). These pairs are stored in H5 indexed by z7[0]. H5 has 2




= 1 pair lie in each row.
To generate the data pairs needed to launch the attack, we use structures of data where in each
structure the bytes (0; 2; 5; 7; 8; 10; 13; 15) take all the 264 possible values and the other 8 bytes
take arbitrary fixed value. We encrypt each structure using two tweaks T1 and T2 where T is
nonzero at byte 0 and zero elsewhere. The pairs used in the attack are generated such that one
message is encrypted using T1 and the other is encrypted using T2. This means that, for each two
structures, we can generate 264 (264 1)1=2  2127 plaintexts-tweaks pairs 1, satisfying the
1The probability that T [0] equals P [0] is 2 8, and thus the possibility they do not cancel each other is
1  2 8  1.
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conditions that bytes (0; 2; 5; 7; 8; 10; 13; 15) have a nonzero difference, the remaining 8 bytes
have a zero difference, and the tweak have a nonzero difference in byte 0, as shown in Figure
7.3.
The attack proceeds as follows:
1. First, we take 2n structures encrypted using T1 and T2 and filter their corresponding ci-
phertexts such that they have a nonzero difference in bytes 0, 7, 10, 13, and a zero differ-
ence in the other 12 bytes. This is a 96-bit filtration on all the 2n+127 plaintexts-tweaks
combinations pairs, so at the end of this step the expected number of remaining pairs from
all structures is 2n+127  2 96 = 2n+31 pairs.
2. Next, we use proposition 4.1 of bijective S-boxes: for specific input and output differences
of the S-box, there is, on average, one pair of actual values that satisfies these differences.
As w1[0; 1; 2; 3] takes (28  1)2  216 possible values then so is y1[0; 5; 10; 15]. Since
for any of the remaining plaintext pairs, P is known, k0 is the known difference in the
tweak, the knowledge of y1[0; 5; 10; 15] allows us to deduce the value of k0[0; 5; 10; 15]
using the aforementioned S-box property. Therefore, we execute the following steps:
 We initialize 232 empty lists, each corresponds to a different guess of k0[0; 5; 10; 15].
 For each of the 2n+31 remaining plaintext pairs, and for each of the 216 possible
values of y1[0; 5; 10; 15], we deduce the keys that lead this specific pair to that spe-
cific difference and add this pair to the list that corresponds to the deduced key guess.
There are 2n+31216 = 2n+47 suggestions distributed over 232 possible subkeys, and
hence, for each key guess, we expect 2n+15 pairs to be stored in the corresponding
list.
For each of the possible values of k0[0; 5; 10; 15], we access the corresponding list and
for each of the 2n+15 pairs in that list, we perform the following:
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3. We access the row with index P [2; 7; 8; 13] inH1. For each pair in that row, we deduce a
candidate for k0[2; 7; 8; 13]. Based on the structure of H1, we expect 216 such candidates.
4. For each of these 216 candidates for k0[2; 7; 8; 13], we perform the following steps:
(a) According to the key schedule, deduce the two bytes k1[0]; k1[2] from the knowledge
of (k0[0]; k0[13]), (k0[2]; k0[15]), respectively.
(b) We partially encrypt the plaintext pair to get (x2[0; 2]; x02[0; 2]) and x2[8; 10].
(c) For i = 1; 2; 3:
i. We access the row with index x2[0]kx02[0]kx2[10] in H2;i. For each pair in that
row, we deduce a candidate for k1[10]. Based on the structure ofH2;i, we expect
just one such candidate.
ii. We access the row with index x2[2]kx02[2]kx2[8] in H3;conj(i). For each pair in
that row, we deduce a candidate for k1[8]. Based on the structure of H3;conj(i),
we expect one such candidate.
5. We access the row with index C[0; 7; 10; 13]T in H4. For each pair in that row, we
deduce a candidate for k8[0; 7; 10; 13]. Based on the structure of H4, we expect 28 such
candidates.
6. For each of the 28 candidates for k8[0; 7; 10; 13], we perform the following:
(a) After changing the order of the MC and AK operations in round 7, we partially
decrypt the cipher text pair to get (x8[0]; x08[0]).
(b) We access the row with index x8[0] in H5. For each pair in that row, we deduce a
candidate for u7[0]. Based on the structure of H5, we expect one such candidate.
7. In this step, for each of the 2n+15 corresponding pairs, we know 216 3 28 1  225:58
joint values of k0[2; 7; 8; 13]kk1[0; 2; 8; 10]kk8[0; 7; 10; 13]ku7[0] that result in the impos-
sible differential. We remove these values from the list of all the 288 possible values for
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these joint subkeys (recall that k1[0]; k1[2] are computed via the key schedule as explained
in step 4 (a) and thus these 13 key bytes take 288 possible values only). After trying all
the pairs, if the list is not empty, we output the values in the list along with the guess of
k0[0; 5; 10; 15] as the candidates for the 120-bit target subkey.
Attack Complexity For each of the 232 values of k0[0; 5; 10; 15], and for each of the 2n+15
pairs, we remove, on average, 225:58 values out of the 288 possible values of the target subkeys.
Thus the probability that a wrong subkey is not discarded with one pair is 1  225:58
288
= 1 2 62:42.
Therefore, after examining all the 2n+15 pairs, we would have 2120(1   2 62:42)2n+15  2120 
2 1:42
n 47:42 remaining candidates for the 120-bit target subkey. To have one candidate, n will
be 53.84.
In Table 7.1, we calculate the time complexities of the different steps of the attack as a func-
tion of n. As can be seen from the table, the attack time complexity is dominated by steps 1 and
7. In order to optimize the overall time complexity of the attack we set n = 52:64, in this case,
we recover 268 candidates for the 120-bit target subkeys. For each of these candidates and con-
sidering the key schedule relations, two additional key bytes k0[4] and k0[6] can be determined
by the knowledge of (k0[8]; k1[8]; k1[0]) and (k0[10]; k1[10]; k1[2]), respectively. This means that
we have 268 candidates for 10 bytes of k0 and to recover the master key, we exhaustively search
through the remaining 6 bytes. Hence, the overall time complexity of the attack to recover the
master key is 252:64+64+1 + (268  248)  2118:04 encryptions in addition to 252:64+72:58 = 2125:22
memory access. According to [53], an AES round may be implemented in a 32-bit architectures
using 20 memory accesses; 16 table lookups for SB; SR;MC, and 4 table lookups for AK,





encryptions. In this case, the data complexity of the attack is about 2116:64 chosen plaintexts
encrypted using two tweaks, i.e., 2117:64 plaintexts-tweaks combinations.
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Step Time Complexity n = 52.64
1 2n+64+1 E 2117:64
2 2n+31  216 = 2n+47 MA 299:64
3 232  2n+15  216 = 2n+63 MA 2115:64




= 2n+59:32 E 2111:96
4(c)i 232  2n+15  216  3 = 2n+64:58 MA 2117:22
4(c)ii 232  2n+15  216  3 = 2n+64:58 MA 2117:22
5 232  2n+15  28 = 2n+55 MA 2107:64




= 2n+50 E 2102:64
6(b) 232  2n+15  28  1 = 2n+55 MA 2107:64
7 232  2n+15  216  3 28  1 = 2n+72:58 MA 2125:22
Table 7.1: Time complexity of the different steps of the attack on 8-round Kiasu-BC, where E:
Encryption and MA: Memory Access
The memory requirement of the attack is dominated by the memory needed to produce 232
lists of step 2, which is equal to 2n+312164 = 2101:64 128-bit blocks of memory, and the mem-
ory needed as the list of removed candidates of k0[2; 7; 8; 13]kk1[0; 2; 8; 10]kk8[0; 7; 10; 13]ku7[0].
For each guess of k0[0; 5; 10; 15], there exist 288 such candidates, and the list is refreshed for
each guess, hence, we only need 288 104-bit block of memory for step 7. Therefore, the overall
memory complexity is about 2101:64 128-bit memory blocks.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the security of the tweakable block cipher Kiasu-BC with
respect to impossible differential cryptanalysis. In contrast to the designers’ claim, we have
presented an impossible differential attack on 8-round Kiasu-BC by adopting one of the ex-
isting impossible differential distinguishers on AES-128 and exploiting the tweak to have a
zero difference round and hence extend the differential path by one additional analysis round in
comparison to the impossible differential attacks on AES-128.
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Chapter 8
Impossible Differential Properties of
Reduced Round Streebog
In this chapter, we investigate the impossible differential properties of the underlying block
cipher and compression function of the cryptographic hashing standard of the Russian federation
Streebog. Our differential trail is constructed in such a way that allows us to recover the key
of the underlying block cipher by observing input and output pairs of the compression function
which utilizes the block cipher in Miyaguchi-Preneel mode. We discuss the implication of this
attack when utilizing Streebog to construct a MAC using the secret-IV construction.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [2].
8.1 Introduction
In late 2012, Streebog [138] was announced as the Russian cryptographic hashing standard
GOST R 34.11-2012. It officially replaced GOST R 34.11-94 which has been theoretically
broken in [155] and further analyzed in [109, 110]. The output length of the Streebog hash
function can be either 512 or 256-bit. Its compression function is based on a 12-round AES-like
block cipher with 8  8-byte internal state, followed by an XOR operation with a whitening
108
key. The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel mode and is plugged in Merkle-
Damga˚rd domain extender with a finalization step [84].
Literature related to the cryptanalysis of Streebog includes the analysis of the collision resis-
tance of its compression function and internal cipher by AlTawy et al. [7], and Wang et al. [151].
An integral analysis of the compression function has been presented by AlTawy and Youssef
where integral distinguishers for the reduced compression function was proposed [8]. More-
over, preimage attacks on the reduced hash function have been independently proposed by Al-
Tawy and Youssef [9], and Zou et al. [155], and later the attacks were improved by Bingka et
al. [105]. In addition, Kazymyrov and Kazymyrova presented an analysis of the algebraic as-
pects of the function [84], and a long second preimage attack was proposed by Guo et al. [70].
Finally, a malicious version of the whole hash function was presented in [12], and a differential
fault analysis when the function is used in different MAC schemes was proposed [10].
As explained in section 1.2, a MAC scheme [17] is a symmetric-key construction that pro-
vides mutual entity authentication and data integrity. Two common approaches are used to
construct MAC schemes. The first approach employs a block cipher or a permutation, e.g., Ci-
pher Block Chaining (CBC)-MAC [76], PELICAN-MAC [55], and ALPHA-MAC [54]. The
second approach is based on hash functions where a secret key shared between the communi-
cating parties is processed in a specific construction by the hash function, which is consequently
viewed as a keyed hash function. Examples of this approach include simple prefix MAC [124],
secret-IV MAC [124], NMAC [17], and the internationally standardized HMAC [17]. Attacks
on MAC schemes usually aim to investigate their resistance against forgery attacks and key
recovery attacks. The latter attack is more devastating since it directly grants the attacker the
ability to impersonate any of the communicating parties and consequently forge any given mes-
sage. As a result, analyzing hash-based MACs with respect to key recovery attacks has been the
main aspect of many proposed works [68, 72].
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When considering a hash function in a given MAC scheme, the first step is to analyze the
security of the underlying primitives operating in the secret key model against key recovery
attacks. Consequently, key recovery attacks on the underlying primitives has been considered
as a valuable analytic model for the hash function. Such model has been adopted by Bouillaguet
et al. in their analysis of the SHA-3 submission Lesamnta [38], where they presented a key
recovery attack on the internal cipher reduced to 22 rounds. Additionally, the cryptanalysis of
the SHA-3 submission EDON-R [98], where Laurent presented a key recovery attack on the
function when used in the Secret-IV MAC.
One of the prospective applications of Streebog, as any other hash function, is using it in
MAC schemes. Though both the simple prefix and the secret-IV MACs are vulnerable to length
extension attacks, and the nested HMAC construction is internationally standardized, Streebog
is by design not vulnerable to length extension attacks. This property may tempt users to adopt
simpler MAC constructions such as the secret-IV setting. In this approach, the standard initial
value is replaced by the secret key in the iterative construction of the hash function. More for-
mally, MAC(M) = H(K;M), where H(K;M) is the hash value of the message M using the
secret key K as the IV. Indeed, the designers of the NIST SHA-3 hash function, keccak [18,43],
state on their website that since keccak is not vulnerable to length extension attacks, it does not
need HMAC and propose that MAC computation can be done by concatenating the key with the
message [85]. It should also be noted that the proof of security of the Miyaguchi-Preneel mode
assumes that the underlying block cipher is ideal and must exhibit no distinguishing property.
Accordingly, the results presented in this chapter are also interesting from this perspective since
they are relevant to these indistinguishability claims.
In this chapter, we provide a security evaluation of Streebog’s compression function when
used in the secret key model where the IV is replaced by a secret key. More precisely, we
present an Impossible Differential property of the underlying block cipher and compression
function and employ it to recover the secret-IV of the compression function. Table 8.1 provides
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a summary of current cryptanalytic results on the Streebog hash function.
Target #Rounds Time Memory Data Attack Reference
Internal cipher
5 28 28 - Free-start
[7]
8 264 28 - collision
3.75 - - - ID distinguisher Sec. 3
Internal permutation
6.5 264 - 264
Distinguisher [8]
7.5 2120 - 2120
Compression function
7.75 2184 28 - Semi free-start
[7]
4.75 28 - - collision
7.75 272 28 - Semi free-start
8.75 2128 28 - near collision
9.75 2184 28 -
6.75 2399:5 2349 2483:1 Secret-IV recovery Sec. 4
6 264 - 264
Distinguisher [8]
7 2120 - 2120
Hash function
5 2122 264 - Collision [155]
6 2496 264 - Preimage [105]




12 2266   - Long second [70]
preimage
Table 8.1: Summary of the current cryptanalytic results on Streebog.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 8.2, the specification of the Stree-
bog hash function along with the notation used throughout the chapter are provided. A brief
recall of impossible differential cryptanalysis and how it can be applied to the compression
function of Streebog is given in Section 8.3. Afterwards, in Section 8.4, we provide detailed de-
scription of the impossible differential attack on the underlying block cipher and the complexity
of the attack. Finally, this chapter is summarized in Section 8.5.
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8.2 Specification of Streebog
Streebog outputs a 512 or 256-bit hash value and can process up to 2512-bit message. The
compression function iterates over 12 rounds of an AES-like cipher with an 8 8 byte internal
state and a final round of key mixing. The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel
mode and is plugged in Merkle-Damga˚rd domain extender with a finalization step.
Figure 8.1: Streebog’s compression function gN
The input message M is padded into a multiple of 512 bits by appending one followed by
zeros. Given M = mnk::km1km0, the compression function gN is fed with three inputs: a
chaining value hi 1, a message block mi 1, and a block size counter Ni 1 = 512  i. (see
Figure 8.1). Let hi be a 512-bit chaining variable. The first state is loaded with the initial value
IV and assigned to h0. The hash value of M is computed as follows:
hi  gN(hi 1;mi 1; Ni 1) for i = 1; 2; ::; n+ 1




where h(M) is the hash value of M . As depicted in Figure 8.1, the compression function gN
consists of:
 KN : a nonlinear whitening round of the chaining value. It takes a 512-bit chaining vari-
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able hi 1 and a block size counter Ni 1 and outputs a 512-bit key K.
 E: an AES-based cipher that iterates over the message for 12 rounds in addition to a
finalization key mixing round. The cipher E takes a 512-bit key K and a 512-bit message
block m as a plaintext. As shown in Figure 8.2, it consists of two similar parallel flows
for the state update and the key scheduling.
Figure 8.2: The internal block cipher (E)
Both KN and E operate on an 8  8 byte key state K. E updates an additional 8  8 byte
message state M . In one round, the state is updated by the following sequence of transforma-
tions
 AddKey(X): XOR with either a round key, a constant, or a block size counter (N)
 SubBytes (S): A nonlinear byte bijective mapping.
 Transposition (P): Byte permutation.
 LinearTransformation (L): Left multiplication by an MDS matrix in GF(2).
Initially, the key stateK is loaded with the chaining value hi 1 and updated byKN as follows:
k0 = L  P  S X(Ni 1)
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Now K contains the key k0 to be used by the cipher E. The message state M is initially loaded
with the message blockm andE(k0;m) runs the key scheduling function on stateK to generate
12 round keys k1; k2; ::; k12 as follows:
ki = L  P  S X(Ci 1), for i = 1; 2; ::; 12;
where Ci 1 is the ith round constant. The state M is updated as follows:
Mi = L  P  S X(ki 1), for i = 1; 2; :::; 12:
The final round output is given byE(k0;m) = M12k12. The output of gN in the Miyaguchi-
Preneel mode is E(KN(hi 1; Ni 1);mi 1)  mi 1  hi 1. For further details, the reader is
referred to [138].
8.2.1 Notation
Let M be an (8 8)-byte state denoting an input message state. The following notations are
used throughout this chapter:
 M Ii : A state at the beginning of round i.
 MXi , MSi , MPi and MOi : The message state at round i after the application of AddKey,
SubBytes, Transposition and Linear Transformation, respectively. intuitively, MOi 1 = M
I
i
for i >= 2.
 Mi[r, c]: A byte at row r and column c of state Mi. Another representation of state bytes
is an enumeration 0; 1; 2; 3; ::::; 63 as shown in Figure 8.3.
 Mi[row r]: Eight bytes located at row r of Mi state.
 Mi[col c]: Eight bytes located at column c of Mi state.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
Row 0
Column 0 
Figure 8.3: The 8 8 state of Streebog
8.3 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of the Compression
Function
Although Streebog’s compression function employs an AES-like cipher, applying the com-
monly used 4-round impossible differential of AES as is on Streebog’s compression function
would not be of value. In this case, we would recover the key of the last round of the block cipher
masked by the chaining value (recall that Streebog’s compression function works in Miyaguchi-
Preneel mode). Therefore, we opted to reverse the impossible differential as detailed below to
help recover the key of the first round, i.e., k0. Since the key scheduling is bijective, once k0 is
recovered, we can recover the secret chaining value in the case of a secret-IV MAC construction
when applied only at the level of the compression function. We note that the impossible dif-
ferential property of Streebog’s compression function would be limited to 3.75-rounds because,
unlike AES, in the Streebog underlying block cipher, the linear transformation in the last round
is not omitted.
As depicted in Figure 8.4, this impossible differential property states that given a pair of M Ii
with any 7 active bytes in the same arbitrary row (row 0 is chosen in the figure for illustration
purposes), MPi+3 cannot have only one active byte (similarly, that active byte can be any byte
out of the 64-byte state). The deterministic differentials in this property are different from those
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of the AES property; on top of being swapped, the forward differential is just 1-round while
the backward differential is 2.75 rounds. The property is rationalized as follows: any 7 active
bytes in the same row of M Ii give 56 active bytes by M
O
i with one entire row being equal (the
position of the zero-difference byte in the input will determine the position of the row). On the
other hand, one active byte in MPi+3 leads to a full active state where all 64 bytes are active in
M Ii+1, which means that the middle states contradict with each other as illustrated in Figure 8.4.
As explained above, this impossible differential holds regardless of the row and the positions
within that row.
X S P L





Figure 8.4: Impossible differential property of the internal block cipher
Figure 8.5 gives an example of impossible input and output patterns for the compression
function. When the compression function message input has specific non-zero difference at
bytes 0 to 6 (0 to 6 in the figure) and zero difference in all the other bytes, then after the
feedforward the output difference cannot have the same values as the input difference at bytes
0 to 6 (0 to 6) and a non-zero difference at byte 56 (7). Such input and output difference
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patterns are impossible on the compression function level. It is to be noted that there exists
8  8  2557 such input patterns (the input differences can be in any row and the inactive byte
can be at any column of that row and each of the differences can take 28   1 possible values.
There are also ((78)+1)255 = 57255 contradicting output patterns (the non-zero output
difference byte can be at any column of 7 rows, i.e., all but the input differences row and takes



































Figure 8.5: Example of impossible differentials for the 3:75 round reduced compression func-
tion
8.4 Impossible Differential Attack on 6.75 rounds of Stree-
bog’s Compression Function
Considering the aforementioned impossible differential property, a 6.75-rounds attack on
Streebog’s compression function can be mounted as detailed hereafter. In our attack model,
we assume access to the keyed Streebog’s reduced compression function oracle which allows
us to query the keyed oracle with chosen messages and get the corresponding compression
function outputs.
The attack is illustrated in Figure 8.6 and proceeds as follows:
1. The keyed compression function oracle is fed with 2n structures where each structure
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consists of 2256 messages having the same value in columns 4, 5, 6 and 7 and assuming
all possible 2256 values in columns 0, 1, 2 and 3. Accordingly, each structure offers
2256  2256  1=2 ' 2511 pairs of messages. Thus, we have a total of 2n+256 messages,
and 2n+511 message pairs for the 2n structures.
2. As we have access to the output of the compression function, which operates in Miyaguchi-
Preneel mode as depicted in Figure 8.1, the output hi that we observe is hi 1mi 1ci 1
where ci 1 is the corresponding output of the reduced variant of the block cipher when its
input is mi 1. Therefore, for each message query, we first XOR the compression func-
tion output with the corresponding input message, i.e., hi mi 1, to get ci 1  hi 1 and
keep only the pairs that have non-zero difference in just one column. Consequently, it is
expected to have 2n+511  2 448 = 2n+63 pairs.
3. Next, we randomly assume a 256-bit value of the first round key at columns 0, 1, 2 and 3,
i.e., k0[col 0; 1; 2; 3], partially encrypt these 4 columns of the message pairs correspond-
ing to the remaining ciphertext pairs, i.e., we compute MO1 [row 0; 1; 2; 3] = L  P 
S[M I1 [col 0; 1; 2; 3] k0[col 0; 1; 2; 3]] and we choose the pairs which have just one non-
zero difference byte at column 0 of the 4 rows, as shown in Figure 8.6. The probability
of such combination is q1 = (2 8)7  (2 8)7  (2 8)7  (2 8)7 = 2 224. Accordingly,
2n+63  2 224 = 2n 161 message pairs are expected to pass this step.
4. Afterwards, we assume a 32-bit value for the bytes 0, 1, 2 and 3 of column 0 of the key k1,
i.e., bytes 0, 8, 16, 24 as in Figure 8.3, partially encrypt these bytes through the second
round to compute MO2 [row 0] = L  P  S[M I2 [(0; 1; 2; 3); 0]  k1[(0; 1; 2; 3); 0]. We
choose the pairs that have only one zero-difference byte at any column of that row. The
probability of such pairs is q2 = 82 8 = 2 5. So after this step, we have 2n 1612 5 =
2n 166 message pairs.
5. Then, we assume a 64-bit value for the last column of k7[col 7]hi 1[col 7] so that we end
up with the block cipher output (Note: hi 1 is the targeted secret-IV to be recovered and
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it has the same value for all the pairs we have). Specifically, we calculate MP7 [col 7] =
(ci 1[col 7] hi 1[col 7]) (k7[col 7] hi 1[col 7]) for all the pairs we have so far. The
former value is the output we get from step 2, while the latter is the value we just assumed.
6. For each of the filtered pairs, we partially decrypt column 7. In other words, we compute
L 1  ((S 1  P 1(MP7 [col 7]))  (S 1  P 1(MP7 [col 7])) and we choose the pairs
which have only one non-zero difference byte at any position of row 7, which happens
with probability p = 8 (2 8)7 = 2 53. This difference is impossible, hence each key (or
to be exact each k7hi 1 i.e., k7const ) that results in such a difference is a wrong key.
Therefore, after analyzing 2n 166 pairs, only 264 (1 2 53)2n 166 ' 264 (e 1)2n 219 '
264  2 1:4(2n 219) wrong values of the last column of k7  hi 1 remains.











Figure 8.6: 6.75-rounds impossible differential attack on the compression function
To be able to find the correct partial keys, we discard the 64-bit values for k7hi 1 unless the
initial guess of the 256-bit value of k0 and the 32-bit value of k1 is correct. The wrong values
(k0; k1; k7) remain with probability: 2(256+32)  264  2 1:4(2n 219) = 2352 1:4(2n 219) which
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should be made as small as possible, e.g., less than 2 30 (that value is chosen to maximize the
probability of finding the correct tuple without having a significant impact on the number of
messages needed) which means 2352 1:4(2n 219) < 2 30 resulting in n > 227:09. Accordingly,
when we start with 2227:1 structures and there remains a value of k7  hi 1, we consider the
assumed 256-bit value for k0 is correct and the probability of wrong value of (k0; k1; k7) is
2 32:1.
Attack Complexity. With n set to 227:1, the attack requires 2n+256 = 2483:1 chosen messages.
The time complexity of the attack is calculated as follows:
 In step 3, row 0 requires 2  264  2n+63  1=8 = 2n+125 one round encryptions, row
1 requires 2  264  264  2n+7  1=8 = 2n+133 one round encryptions, row 2 requires
2  264  264  264  2n 49  1=8 = 2n+141 one round encryptions and row 3 requires
2 264  264  264  264  2n 105  1=8 = 2n+149 one round encryptions.
 In step 4, row 0 requires 2 2256 232 2n 161 1=16 = 2n+124 one round encryptions.
 In step 6, column 7 decryption requires 2  2256  232  264  (1 + (1   2 53) + (1  
2 53)2 + :::+ (1  2 53)2n 166) 1=16 ' 2402 one round encryptions.
 For n = 227:1, the overall complexity of the attack is about (2352:1 + 2360:1 + 2368:1 +
2376:1 + 2351:1 + 2402)=6:75 ' 2399:5 encryptions to recover 256 bits of k0.
Then, the other half of k0 can be found by an exhaustive search. Hence, the whole k0 can be
recovered with time complexity of 2399:5 + 2256 ' 2399:5 queries. Once k0 is recovered, we can
easily recover the secret-IV hi 1. Finally, the memory requirement is dominated by the memory
needed to store the list of the deleted key tuples (k0,k1,k7), so we need 2352=23 = 2349 bytes.
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8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have analyzed Streebog’s compression function in the secret key model.
More precisely, we have proposed Secret-IV recovery attack, at the level of the compression
function, based on impossible differential properties of the compression function. The attack
requires 2483:1 messages, has a time complexity equivalent to 2399:5 queries to the compression
function reduced to 6:75 rounds and needs 2349 bytes of memory. Finally, it should be noted
that this attack does not directly contradict the security claims of Streebog and does not present
any immediate practical threat to its security. However, it helps as a cautionary note for using
Streebog in this mode since it might be tempting to do so because the finalization stage of
Streebog is strengthened against length extension attacks that are the main reasons for not using
secret-IV or secret-prefix MAC constructions.
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Chapter 9
Summary and Future Research Directions
9.1 Summary of contributions
In this section, we briefly summarize the accomplished work and the major contributions of
this thesis. In chapter 1, we presented the motivation for this work and in chapter 2, we pro-
vided the essential background by formally introducing block ciphers and their most common
cryptanalysis techniques.
In chapter 3, we addressed the limitation of the existing MILP modeling approaches and
proposed an efficient way to generate the linear inequalities representing the differential propa-
gation through large S-boxes (6-bit and upwards). Our proposed approach starts by separating
the DDT entries of the S-box by their values where a Boolean function is assigned to each dis-
tinct value. Then, each Boolean function is converted to its minimized product-of-sum form
that can be efficiently represented by a set of linear inequalities. Our approach allowed us to
precisely evaluate the probability of differential characteristics. It has been applied to two of the
efficient AES-round function based constructions proposed in FSE 2016 by Jean and Nikolic´.
It helped us improve the lower bound on the number of the active S-boxes in one construction
and the upper bound on the differential characteristic of the other. Although our approach was
applied in the context of differential cryptanalysis, it can easily be applied in other techniques
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such as linear cryptanalysis.
Then, in chapter 4, we analyzed the security of the Japanese Hierocrypt-L1 block cipher
against MitM attack in the single-key setting. In particular, we constructed a five S-box layer
distinguisher that we utilized to launch a meet-in-the-middle attack on 8 S-box layer round-
reduced Hierocrypt-L1 using the differential enumeration technique. Our attack allowed us to
recover the master key with data complexity of 249 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2114:8 8
S-box layers Hierocrypt-L1 encryptions and memory complexity of 2106 64-bit blocks. This was
the first cryptanalysis result that reaches eight S-box layers of Hierocrypt-L1 in the single-key
setting.
In chapter 5, we presented two meet-in-the-middle attacks in the single-key setting on eight
S-box layer reduced version of another Japanese block cipher, i.e., Hierocrypt-3 with 256-bit
key. The first attack was based on the differential enumeration approach where we proposed a
truncated differential characteristic in the first six S-box layers and matched a multiset of state
differences at its output. The other attack was based on the original meet-in-the-middle attack
strategy proposed by Demirci and Selc¸uk at FSE 2008 to attack reduced versions of both AES-
192 and AES-256. The master key was recovered with data complexity of 2113 chosen plain-
texts, time complexity of 2238 eight S-box layer reduced Hierocrypt-3 encryptions and memory
complexity of 2218 128-bit blocks in the attack based on the differential enumeration. The data,
time and memory complexities of the second attack were 232, 2245 and 2239, respectively. Again,
these were the first attacks on eight S-box layer reduced Hierocrypt-3.
In chapter 6, we presented an impossible differential attack on the ARX-based block ci-
pher SPARX-64/128. Particularly, we presented 12 and 13-round impossible distinguishers on
SPARX-64/128 that can be used to attack 15 and 16-round with post-whitening keys, respec-
tively. While the 15-round attack started from round zero, the 16-round one, exploiting the key
schedule, had to start from round two.
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Continuing with the impossible differential attack, in chapter 7, we presented an impossible
differential attack on Kiasu-BC that is one of the instantiations of the TWEAKEY framework. It
can be considered as tweakable AES-128. Contrary to the designers’ claim, we proved that the
security of Kiasu-BC is not identical to the security of AES-128 when it comes to impossible
differential attacks. More precisely, we showed that an 8-round impossible differential attack
on Kiasu-BC is feasible by adopting one of the existing impossible differential distinguishers
on AES-128 and exploiting the tweak to gain this extra round in comparison to the impossible
differential attacks on AES-128.
Lastly, in chapter 8, we investigated the impossible differential properties of the underlying
block cipher and compression function of the cryptographic hashing standard of the Russian
federation Streebog. Our differential trail was constructed in such a way that allowed us to
recover the key of the underlying block cipher by observing input and output pairs of the com-
pression function that utilizes the block cipher in Miyaguchi-Preneel mode. We discussed the
implication of this attack when utilizing Streebog to construct a MAC scheme using the secret-
IV construction and pointed out that although the finalization stage of Streebog is strengthened
against length extension attacks, using it in the secret-IV mode might incur some risks of ex-
posing the secret key.
9.2 Future work
Here below, we list some topics that would be of interest for future research.
 We have applied our new proposed MILP modeling to represent the differential propa-
gation through an 8-bit S-box to two AES-round based constructions. Hence, it would
be of interest to find other meaningful applications with maybe less uniform S-boxes.
Moreover, we have emphasized the applicability of our approach in other cryptanalysis
techniques so it would be equally interesting to use it in linear cryptanalysis, impossible
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differential cryptanalysis or zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis.
 We have studied the security of some symmetric-key primitives under the classical black-
box attack model, which assumes that the parties of the communication are trusted. It also
assumes that the primitive is always executed in a secure environment. This implies that
the capabilities of the adversary are limited to having access to the inputs and outputs of
such a symmetric-key primitive. With the proliferation of computer and communication
devices and the wide spread of the Internet and mobile networks, other equally important
attack models emerged, e.g., the gray-box and the white-box attack models. In the gray-
box attack model, implementation-specific information, such as the execution time or the
power consumption, is exploited as such information is typically correlated to the secret
key. The white-box attack model assumes an even more powerful adversary who has
full access to the software implementation of a symmetric-key primitive as well as full
control over its execution environment. This means that this powerful attacker can use
debuggers with breakpoints to observe and change, if desired, intermediate results of the
software implementation. Therefore, it would be of great interest to analyze symmetric-
key primitives under these other attack models, especially, the white-box one that has not
been well studied in academia.
 We have analyzed the impossible differential properties of the underlying block cipher of
the Streebog hash function and extended it to its compression function. The results in [64]
show that the modular sum finalization stage weakens the function when used in HMAC
construction, so it would be of interest to extend our attack to the full hash function as it
requires further investigation of the compression function one wayness properties.
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